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Globalization of financial markets has increased dramatically over the last decades.
Kose, Prasad, Rogoff, and Wei (2006) report that average gross stocks of foreign assets
and liabilities across 71 countries have risen from around $7 trillion in the early 1980s to $76
trillion in the early 2000s. Global daily foreign exchange market turnover has increased
from $820 billion in 1992 to $3,210 billion in 2007 (Bank for International Settlements
(2007)). Besides deregulation, liberalization and financial innovation, technological ad-
vances were a key catalyst for this development. In particular, progress in computer and
telecommunication technology have fundamentally changed the workings of financial mar-
kets. Financial institutions can gather, process and store as well as exchange information
at much greater speed than before. Similarly, the cost of initiating, clearing and settling
transactions and thus trading in general have been cut. Trade volume increased as a result
of these improved conditions and the emergence of fully automated (algorithmic) trading.
These developments have fundamentally changed the behavior and complexity of finan-
cial markets. Financial economists are challenged to investigate markets that aggregate
the interaction and decisions of millions of people across the globe. Fortunately, the last
decades have also witnessed strong progress in macroeconomics and the very same advances
in computer science have equipped researchers with increasingly powerful tools. Starting
from groundbreaking work in the 1970s and 1980s, for example in Lucas (1982), economists
were able to analyze dynamic models that capture key aspects of equity and bond returns
(e.g. Bansal and Yaron (2004), Campbell and Cochrane (1999)) and business cycles (e.g.
Smets and Wouters (2007)). Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models have
emerged as an important policy tool for central banks around the world. Despite consid-
erable progress, numerous empirical observations demand further analysis. For instance,
researchers have made only modest progress in understanding why carry trades, the strat-
egy of borrowing in low interest currencies while investing in high interest currencies, have
on average been profitable (forward premium puzzle) in the past 40 years.
This dissertation studies returns on financial markets, their connection to the real econ-
omy, as well as agents’ portfolio choice. I consider the complex interplay between housing
with other financial assets and the implication for investors’ homeownership decision in
different countries. Together with my coauthor I study a two-country economy to pro-
vide an explanation for the continued profitability of carry trades for ten different currency
pairs. The distinct international focus in both studies reflects today’s globalized world. We
further study unemployment risk as a potential explanation for the large spread between
equity returns and the low risk-free rate. All papers consider multiple agents interacting
on national or international markets and the idiosyncratic risks they bear. The extension
to multiple agents mitigates the problems surrounding the representative agent paradigm
but naturally results in much more complex models. Due to complexity of the analyzed
models, numerical dynamic programming is the common solution technique in all presented
studies. I use state-of-the-art algorithms, computer programming as well as grid computing
to solve and assess the power of these models.
The paper “Homeownership over the Life-Cycle: A Cross-Country Perspective” studies
homeownership across three major countries – the US, Germany and the UK. Life-cycle
ownership rates are hump shaped in all countries but quite different across countries,
10
both in level and shape. Compared to Germans, US and UK households are generally
more inclined to own homes and tend to purchase their homes earlier in life. The paper’s
objective is to identify cross-country differences that are likely to drive these empirical facts
and to evaluate their validity in light of a life-cycle asset allocation model. Differences in
life-cycle income patterns and housing credit market conditions explain the shape of early-
life homeownership in the US and UK. Further differentiating households by family size and
assuming that larger families have a stronger preference for ownership, the model replicates
the stylized fact of hump shaped ownership profiles in all countries. The calibrated model
closely predicts the empirically observed ownership profile in the US and UK, while the
flat German homeownership profile demands further study.
The observation that high interest currencies tend to appreciate (e.g. carry trades
work) is one of the main puzzles in international finance. Recent evidence suggests that
the puzzle was most pronounced during the 1970s (Lothian and Wu (2011)), but, despite
high financial integration, is still present today (Baillie (2011), Figure 1). The paper “In-
ternational Diversification and the Forward Premium” provides a theoretical explanation
based on investors’ hedging desires. Within a two-country exchange economy with endoge-
nous consumption, we show that habit preferences can lead to portfolio adjustments that
explain the observed relation between interest and exchange rates. Pairwise combinations
of the countries Australia, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom and United States yield ten
country pairs used to assess the predictive power of the model. Under a realistic calibra-
tion, we vary the unobservable habit parameters to study how well our model predicts
the observed co-movements in exchange and interest rates. When we restrict a country’s
habit parameters to remain the same across country pairs, our model is able to predict all
forward premium regression slope coefficients within two standard deviations.
Simultaneously inferring all countrys’ habit calibrations is a difficult optimization prob-
lem. In the paper “Calibrating/Estimating Economic Models Using Parallel Computing”,
I summarize various techniques to estimate parameters in macroeconomic models and de-
scribe the actual calibration strategy we employed in “International Diversification and the
Forward Premium.” To assess the quality of our model we use a variation of the simulated
method of moments. As the target function is highly nonlinear we employ a global opti-
mization routine. Each step of the global optimizer is parallelized and evaluated on a grid
computer. Given the close resemblance to the simulated method of moments, I consider
this calibration scenario to be very general.
Despite strong financial integration and innovation, markets remain far from complete.
Agents cannot fully insure against all possible outcomes in the future. Further, individual
agents usually face much greater uncertainty about their future income than suggested by
fluctuations in GDP. Consequently, undiversifiable idiosyncratic risk has been studied as
a potential explanation for the equity premium puzzle. However, up to now, studies have
largely focused on two-agent economies. Incomplete markets in connection with unemploy-
ment is the topic of the final paper “Asset Pricing with Idiosyncratic Risk: The Impact
of Job Loss”. To allow for a realistic unemployment rate within the model, the number
of agents has to be increased far beyond the literature standard of two agents. The paper
uses the Smolyak approximation algrorithm to analyze six heterogenous agents. We show
11
that undiversifiable labor income risk in the form of unemployment risk simultaneously
leads to a sizable equity premium and a relatively low risk free rate.
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Homeownership over the Life-Cycle: A
Cross-Country Perspective
Benjamin Jonen∗
This paper develops a life-cycle asset allocation model to study the level and life-
cycle patterns of homeownership. The model is calibrated and confronted with data from
three major countries – USA, Germany and UK. Under heterogeneous income profiles
and uncertainty within a country as well as varying housing and credit market conditions
across countries, the model replicates some key aspects of cross-country life-cycle own-
ership. Preference heterogeneity calibrated to varying family size improves the model’s
prediction leading to a good fit in two out of three countries.
∗Department of Banking and Finance, University of Zurich, benjamin.jonen@bf.uzh.ch. I am grateful to
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II.1 Introduction
Homeownership rates vary substantially across countries. Differences can be found both
in overall levels and in life-cycle patterns. Housing investment constitutes a large fraction
of homeowners wealth. Consequently the tenure choice is closely linked to households’
general portfolio decision. I develop a life-cycle asset allocation model with housing to
study ownership rates in three major countries. I show that part of the ownership rate
differences can be explained by heterogeneity in economic fundamentals. In particular,
differences in income profiles and their impact on household wealth accumulation lead
to varying ownership predictions. I also show that preference heterogeneity can further
emphasize the predicted ownership rates’ hump shape bringing the model close to the
data.
Housing claims a special role in the investor’s asset portfolio as it serves a dual purpose:
Occupying a home generates utility, while home equity is an investment vehicle. Since hous-
ing consumption and investment cannot be separated, understanding the homeownership
decision is complex. The majority of papers that consider housing in a life-cycle framework
have the goal to further explore the impact of housing on the household’s other portfolio
holdings, most notably stocks (e.g. Housing, Yamashita, and Flavin (2002), Cocco (2004)
as well as Yao and Zhang (2005a) and Yao and Zhang (2005b)). These papers find that
housing crowds out stock holdings providing an explanation for low stock holdings found
in the data. Rarely, the focus is on ownership rate predictions. Cocco (2004) abstracts
completely from renting and builds his model conditional on owning. Yao and Zhang
(2005a) study asset allocation in the presence of housing and Li and Yao (2007) analyze
life-cycle effects of house prices. While not the main model focus, the latter two papers
yield an ownership rate prediction. They both predict a hump shaped ownership rate (as
empirically observed) but underpredict young households’ ownership rates and overpredict
homeownership in later life.
Building on Davis, Willen, and Kubler (2006) andWillen and Kubler (2006), households
in my model have access to an extensive set of assets. While most other studies rely on
two assets, a stock and a mortgage, households in this model additionally have access to
two types of uncollateralized borrowing. This gives households more flexibility in their
choice of wealth accumulation. The introduction of a minimum housing constraint (as in
Cocco (2004)) produces low ownership participation for young households without relying
on computationally costly transaction costs. While several other studies work with only
one overall income profile per country (usually the US), I use different income profiles
across education groups and countries. Income profiles have substantially different shapes
across education groups and together with income uncertainty are known to impact wealth
accumulation and portfolio choice. I further allow for heterogeneity in required down
payments and minimum house sizes across countries.
To my knowledge, this is the first study of homeownership within a life-cycle framework
across different countries. I calibrate the model to the US, Germany and UK. These three
major countries have very different life-cycle patterns of homeownership (see figure II.2) as
well as credit market conditions. German homeownership rates are relatively low, peaking
16
around 55%, while ownership rates in the UK and US peak around 85% but have different
shapes. Required down payments on mortgage loans are smallest for the UK and largest
for Germany. House values of the least expensive homes turn out to be much higher for
Germany than for the US and UK.
Simulation exercises indicate that the model in its base calibration captures many
aspects of empirical homeownership profiles. The model has difficulties to account for
the below 100% peak in homeownership and the reduction in home ownership among the
elderly. Introducing preference heterogeneity brings the model closer to the data.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section two introduces the model economy and section
three discusses the model calibration. Section four discusses the model results. Computa-
tional and data details are presented in the appendix.
II.2 The model economy
In this section, I describe the general setup of the model economy. The setup is close to
Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) and Davis, Willen, and Kubler (2006).
II.2.1 The representative household
Preferences The economy consists of a large number of households who enter the job
market at age G, retire at age J and live up to age T . Ex-ante they are different
only in terms of their educational attainment. The representative household derives
utility from consuming a numeraire good, denoted Ct and housing services, denoted
Ht. Ht reflects both the physical size of the dwelling as well as its quality. The
within-period utility function is denoted U(Ct, Ht).
Endowments Each period, the household receives an exogenous stream of labor income
(Yt). The income stream is stochastic and made up of three components. A de-
termistic part and a persistent as well as transitory shock. The parameters of the
income process depend on the household’s education level. Income is a function of
age (t), education (e), other individual characteristics (Zi,t), the persistent shock and
the transitory shock. After retirement households are assumed to receive a fixed frac-
tion of their income in the year prior to retirement as a pension. Thus, log income
(yt) follows
yt = f(t, e, Zi,t) + νi,t + ǫi,t, t ≤ J
and
yt = λf(J, e, Zi,t), t > J,
where ǫi,t is distributed N(0, σ
2
ǫ ) and νi,t is given by
νi,t = θνi,t−1 + ui,t,
where ui,t is distributed N(0, σ
2
u)
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II.2.2 Financial assets
The investment opportunity set is constant. The household can choose from five assets.
Three of these assets represent debt instruments that the household is only allowed to
short. To ease notation, positive holdings of such assets will be defined as a short position
so that a universal nonnegativity constraint can be enforced. The following menu of assets
is available:
Housing (θH) Housing is both a consumption good and an asset and generates a de-
terministic (gross) return of RH . While empirically house price volatility is non-
negligible, both at the aggregate and the individual level, a stochastic house price
requires the introduction of a second endogenous state variable. Also to avoid a
second state variable, I abstract from transaction costs. While transaction costs
have been shown to have an impact on the home ownership decision (see Li and
Yao (2007)), I believe that other factors play a more important role in determining
ownership over the life-cycle.
Mortgage (θM) Households who decide to become homeowners have access to external
financing through a mortgage up to a certain down payment. The down payment is
enforced each period so that an owner faces the collateral constraint
θHt δ − θMt ≥ 0. (II.1)
The mortgage rate is deterministic and will be denoted RM . There is no scheduled
payment plan as in Li and Yao (2007). Households are free to choose their level of
debt financing each period.
Equity (θE) Equity yields a stochastic (gross) return of R˜E and constitutes the only
savings instrument besides housing.1
Uncollateralized borrowing at low rate (θUl) There are two sources of uncollateral-
ized debt. Up to some level (ζ), the household can borrow at a relatively low rate,
i.e.
−θUlt + ζ ≥ 0. (II.2)
Uncollateralized borrowing at high rate (θUh) Beyond the level ζ, the household is
still able to obtain debt financing, however has to recourse to a loan with an unfa-
vorable interest rate.
Denoting θt = {θHt , θMt , θEt , θUlt , θUht } as the vector collecting all assets defined above, I
impose the short sale constraint
θt ≥ 0. (II.3)
1Previous versions of this paper additionally included a riskless zero-bond as a means of saving. In-
corporating such an asset in the existing framework does not significantly change the results since agents
either invest in housing or in stocks.
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II.2.3 Evolution of wealth and budget constraints
On the expenditure side the household faces the budget constraint
Ct = Yt + Ξt + θ
M
t +−θEt −Dot θHt − (1−Dot )αθHt + θUlt + θUht , (II.4)
where Ξt is current period’s cash attained, D
o
t is an indicator for current period’s ownership
decision and α denotes the rental rate. Wealth accumulates according to
Ξt = −θMt−1R˜M + θEt−1R˜E +Dot−1θHt−1RH − θUlt−1RUl − θUht−1RUh. (II.5)
II.2.4 Renting vs. owning
Following Cocco (2004), households cannot buy houses smaller than (H). Usually it is
difficult to buy only a fraction of a house (e.g. one apartment or one room). Thus an
important characteristic of housing is that it is lumpy which is reflected in the so called
“minimum housing constraint.” To summarize, households that rent may choose a contin-
uous quantity of housing, while those who decide to buy are confined to dwellings above a
minimum size
Dot (θ
H
t −H) ≥ 0. (II.6)
Beyond that minimum size, I assume owners can, just as renters, freely adjust their home
size.
II.2.5 The household’s problem
Neglecting a bequest motive, the household will optimally deplete all its resources at time
T and given its initial wealth (Ξ0), solves the optimization problem at time t = 0
max
θt,D
o
t
E
T∑
t=1
βtU(Ct, Ht),
subject to the budget constraint (eq. (II.4)), the evolution of wealth(eq. (II.5)), the
collateral constraint(eq. (II.1)), the borrowing constraint(eq. (II.2)), a set of short sale
constraints(eq. (II.3)) and the minimum housing constraint (eq. (II.6)).
II.3 Model calibration
This section lays out the general and country-specific calibration.
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II.3.1 Common parameterizations
A household enters the economy at age 21 (t=1) and lives up to age 80 (T=60). Households
retire at age 65 (J=45). Following several others (e.g. Kiyotaki, Michaelides, and Nikolov
(2011)), I assume the following modified Cobb-Douglas utility function2
U(Ct, Ht) =
1
1− γ (C
1−φ
t H
φ
t )
1−γ,
where
Ht = D
o
t θ
H
t + (1−Dot )(1− ψ)θHt .
The utility function implies a utility discount for renting. That means, occupying the
same size and quality of dwelling as a renter provides less utility than as an owner. The
idea is that owners are freely able to renovate and change their homes independent from a
landlord and thus receive higher utility.
Table II.1 summarizes common parameters in the base case. The annual discount
factor (β) and the curvature parameter are set to 0.95 and 2.00 respectively. Housing
preference (φ) is set to 0.20 consistent with the average proportion of household housing
expenditure documented in the 2001 Consumer Expenditure Survey. In absence of inflation,
the interest rates and returns have to be calibrated to their empirical counterparts after
inflation. Empirical estimates, discussed for example in Hu (2005), suggest that the average
annual rental rate in the US has been around 7% for the years of 1993 to 1997. Accounting
for inflation, I set the rental rate to α = 4%. Rental rates vary a lot depending on the
location and dwelling quality and are thus generally difficult to calibrate. Compared to the
literature my estimate is at the lower end of the spectrum and implies a bonus for renting
in the base case. I use the rental discount in the utility function to balance the tenure
decision. I set the low rate cutoff (ζ) to current household income. That is, households
can borrow up to their current income (Yt) at the low rate (RUL) and beyond their current
income at the high rate (RUH). I set the real risk free rate to 2% and the risk premium to
4%. The resulting annual stock return is 6%. I set equity volatility to the historical average
on the S&P 500 of σE˜ = 0.16 and real housing return to E[R˜H ] = 1.00. Goetzmann and
Spiegel (2000) approximate real housing returns in the period of 1980 to 1999 to lie between
-1.00% and 3.46% and Leigh (1980) estimates annual depreciation rate of housing units
for the US to lie between 0.36% and 1.36%. Thus, subtracting an estimate of depreciation
and maintenance cost, a 0% return on housing seems plausible.
II.3.2 Country-specific parameterizations
In this study, I investigate three different countries, the United States (US), Germany
(DE) and the United Kingdom (UK). I assume that countries differ in terms of required
2The assumption of Cobb-Douglas utility is attractive because it yields scale independence. The impli-
cation of an elasticity of intra-temporal substitution of one between housing and non-housing consumption
is only partially in line with empirical estimates. For a discussion see Li and Yao (2007).
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Table II.1: Base case common parameters for both countries.
Parameter Value
Discount factor (β) 0.95
Risk aversion (γ) 2
Rental rate (α) 0.04
Housing weight (φ) 0.20
Low rate cutoff (ζ) Yt
Mortgage rate (E[R˜M − 1]) 0.04
Uncol. low (UL) rate (RUL − 1) 0.06
Uncol. high (UH) rate (RUH − 1) 0.15
Housing return (RH) 1.00
Rental discount (ψ) varies
Average stock return (E[R˜E ]) 1.06
Std. stock return (σE˜) 0.16
down payment, labor income profiles and the minimum house size potential owners face.
I use country-specific panel data to obtain estimates for the necessary parameters. The
country-specific panels are supplemented with data from the Cross National Equivalent
File (CNEF). CNEF data attempts to harmonize the available panel data and allows for
comparable cross-country studies. But because CNEF harmonizes a much broader set of
countries, some variables that exist in the countries I study are not available in CNEF and
I incorporate them manually from the country-specific panels.
Income profiles
Income profiles have been shown to heavily influence households’ decisions on consumption
(see Gourinchas and Parker (2002)) and portfolio choice (see for example Cocco (2004) and
Yao and Zhang (2005a)) and are thus an important determinant in a life-cycle framework.
Furthermore it has been widely documented (see Gourinchas and Parker (2002) and At-
tanasio, Series, Policy, and Bureau (1995)) that income profiles are substantially different
across educational groups. To understand home ownership rates, it is crucial to take this
heterogeneity into account. For this purpose three different income profiles are estimated
for each country.
To make the estimated income profiles comparable to the literature, my estimation
procedure closely follows Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) who estimate income profiles
and uncertainty for the US PSID data set. The estimation makes specific use of the panel
dimension of my datasets. While Yao and Zhang (2005a) take the same approach, a large
number of other studies uses the so called synthetic cohort methods developed in Deaton
(1985) that essentially allow the construction of a panel from repeated cross sections. The
first empirical paper to rely on this technique is Merz (1965). More recently Gourinchas and
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Figure II.1: Income profiles
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This figure displays income profiles for the US, Germany and the UK. I estimate one income profile for
each education group within a country, differentiating between three educational levels: 1) college 2) high
school 3) no high school. I run a fixed effects regression of income on a set of age dummies controlling for
marital status and family size. The income profiles are constructed by fitting a fifth-order polynomial to
the estimated age dummies. Income is broadly defined as pure labor income plus private transfers plus
public transfers plus public pensions minus taxes in 2007 home currency.
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Parker (2001) have made use of these techniques to estimate labor income profiles from the
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). Repeated cross-sections can generate much larger
datasets but intrinsically compare different individuals over time. However, as time passes,
the time dimension of the PSID and other popular panels grows in size, making the use of
panel estimations increasingly attractive.
I estimate income profiles by regressing income on a set of age dummies controlling
for family-fixed effects as well as marital status and family size3 and finally approximating
the resulting age dummies with a fifth-order polynomial. To maintain a large number
of family-year observations an unbalanced fixed-effects model is estimated. I differentiate
three education levels labeled “college”, “high school” and “no high school.” To control
for education, the sample is split up by the household head’s educational attainment. The
variable used to split the sample (education with respect to high school) is provided as
part of the CNEF data set. Following Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) retirement
income is approximated as the average income of households in retirement of age greater
65 divided by average income at age 65.
A broad definition of labor income is adopted. Government and private transfers bound
a household’s income from below. Thus pure labor income understates a household’s
true disposable income. I define labor income as pure labor income plus private transfers
plus public transfers plus public pensions minus taxes in 2007 home currency, where each
component represents the sum over all individuals in a household. It is important to exclude
capital income from this definition since this part of household income is endogenous in
the model. Unfortunately none of the panels differentiates between taxes paid on capital
income versus taxes paid on other income sources. Thus it is impossible to directly back out
the appropriate tax rate on non-capital income. The tax-computation software TAXSIM
(developed by Daniel Feenberg) uses data on US tax law over the last decades and could
be used to compute taxes on non-capital income for the US. Similar software, however, is
not (publicly) available for the other countries. Thus I am forced to use a crude estimate
for individual tax rates. Each year’s tax rate is estimated from total taxes paid divided by
total income.
The resulting income profiles are displayed in Figure II.1. Income profiles are quite
heterogeneous across education groups but also across countries. The estimated income
profiles for the US are very similar to those reported in Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout
(2005). Compared to Germany and the UK, US income profiles tend to be steep. Large
amounts of life-time income are earned in the time between 40 and 50 while income is low
in retirement. The UK income profiles for college and high school educated households
peak around 40 and thus much earlier than German income (about age 50) and earlier
than US income (around age 45). The replacement ratios for college educated households
in the US, Germany and UK are 62%, 78%, 74% respectively.
Carroll and Samwick (1997) show that income uncertainty is an important determinant
of life-cycle wealth accumulation. Since wealth accumulation and housing tenure are likely
linked, the effects of income uncertainty on housing are also important. The stochastic part
3Regression results are reported in Table II.6.
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Table II.2: Uncertainty estimates (%)
Country Education σ2u σ
2
ǫ
US
College 1.57 5.21
High school 1.15 5.93
No high school 1.34 7.61
DE
College 1.38 2.89
High school 1.23 3.53
No high school 1.63 3.87
UK
College 1.47 6.91
High school 1.16 6.14
No high school 1.37 4.90
This table shows uncertainty estimates for the persistent (σ2u) and transitory (σ
2
ǫ ) shock for the different
countries. Estimates are computed following Carroll and Samwick (1997). First, I adjust income for
economic growth, then I remove the predictable component using fixed-effects regressions and finally I run
household specific OLS regressions of d-period income differences on a constant and a trend variable to
obtain the parameter estimates displayed in the table.
of income is parametrized through the volatility of the persistent (σu) and transitory (σǫ)
shocks. I estimate these parameters using the algorithm proposed in Carroll and Samwick
(1997). Differentiating income uncertainty into this permanent and transitory component
is done in the following way. First income is adjusted for economic growth. Second, I
remove the predictable component of individual income by obtaining the residuals of the
fixed effects model used for the income profiles. Then I follow the appendix in Carroll and
Samwick (1997) and run household specific OLS regressions of d-period income differences
on a constant and a trend variable. The household average for the trend coefficient is
the proxy for σu while the constant coefficient is the proxy for σǫ. Table II.2 reports the
estimates for the three countries. Estimates for the US are again similar to those found in
the literature (e.g. Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005)). As expected, transitory shocks
are more volatile the lower the household’s education level for two out of three countries.
The permanent shock is less volatile in all countries and education groups.
Several studies (Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995), Carroll (1997) and Gourinchas
and Parker (2002)) find the autocorrelation coefficient in the νi,t process to be close to one.
In particular Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995) find the AR(1) coefficient to be around
0.95. Thus, I choose θ = 0.95 in the νi,t process.
II.3.3 Minimum house size
Supply of housing available for purchase is an important determinant households’ ownership
decision. To get an approximation of the minimum house size available for purchase, I rely
on house values from the three panels. Table II.3 shows house value percentiles for the US,
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Table II.3: House value (k) percentiles by country
Percentiles US DE UK
1 8 30 27
5 27 80 37
10 46 100 44
25 82 150 58
50 129 200 84
75 201 300 136
90 328 380 216
This table displays the distribution of house values as reported in the different panels across all households.
The values are denominated in the country’s currency and reported in thousands.
Germany and the UK. Since income profiles are in home currency, house values are also
denoted in 2007 home currency and thus have to be converted with the according exchange
rate to be comparable. To calibrate the minimum house value constraint I choose the 25th
percentile of house values as the minimum house value within each country. Thus I set
HUS=$46k, HDE=e150k and HUK=£58k. German housing is generally more expensive,
at the same time, low-value housing in the UK tends to be slightly more expensive than
in the US. While the choice of the 25th percentile is arbitrary, note that the relative
house values are qualitatively the same for the other low percentiles. Interestingly the fact
that owner-occupied housing in Germany (compared to life-time income) is generally more
expensive than in the other two countries, already gives a first indication why German
homeownership rates are rather low.
II.3.4 Down payment
Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) collect information on business practices and regulatory frame-
works for mortgage finance across countries. On the basis of these characteristics countries
are classified in three groups broadly homogenous with respect to structural features of
their mortgage finance markets. Germany falls in the conservative first group, whereas the
US is classified in the second and the UK is classified in the most “agressive” third group.
According to Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) Germany’s maximum loan to value (LTV) ratio
is around 60% whereas the US maximum LTV is around 75-80% and the UK maximum
LTV is 90-100%. I retain the general ordering in lending practices but for the analysis I
set minimum down payments to (1− δGER) = 0.25, (1− δUS) = 0.15 and (1− δUK) = 0.10
respectively.
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Figure II.2: Empirical ownership rates
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This figure displays empirical ownership rate profiles for the US, Germany and the UK. The empirical
ownership profiles are estimated running a logit regression of ownership rate on a fifth-order age polynomial
while controlling for marital status and family size.
II.4 Results
In this section, I describe how well the model can replicate economic data. Empirical
ownership rates are constructed from the country-specific panel data by running a logit
regression of ownership rate on an age polynomial controlling for marital status and family
size. The resulting ownership profiles are reported in Figure II.2. The level of ownership
rates exhibit substantial variation across countries. Average ownership rates in the US
and UK are 74% and 76% respectively while the German ownership rate is only 47%. In
addition, the life-cycle pattern of ownership rates is different across countries. The fastest
increase in ownership rates is in the 20s for the US and UK but in the 30s for German
households. UK ownership rates peak in the 30s while US and German ownership rates
remain high up to the age of 60 before slightly decreasing too. Interestingly the early peak
in ownership rates for the UK coincides with an early peak in the reported income profiles
for college and high school educated households.
First, I evaluate the base case described in the calibration section. Then I study a
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Table II.4: Household size across countries
HH Size US DE UK
1 13.3 20.2 14.7
2 35.0 38.1 35.9
>= 3 51.7 41.7 49.5
This table displays the distribution of household sizes for the US, Germany and the UK.
model extension with heterogeneous preferences within the countries.
II.4.1 Base case ownership rates
Figure II.3 displays the simulated homeownership profile versus the empirical ownership
profile for each country.
The model captures the early-life increases in US ownership rates well but is unable to
simultaneously predict below 100% ownership rates in mid and late life. In particular the
decrease in US ownership rates for retired households is not explained.
The model predicts a late entry into the housing market for German households (around
the age of 30) followed by a fast increase of the ownership rate to 100%. In contrast German
home ownership increase is slow but relatively steady. In principle the model replicates
German low early-life ownership rates but lacks heterogeneity to match the slow increase
in ownership rates. Different income profiles and uncertainty are insufficient to deliver this
heterogeneity. For Germany the model predicts a drop in retired households’ ownership
rates.
The fast increase in UK ownership rates is matched well by the model. Similar to the
US case the model overpredicts ownership rates in mid-life and is unable to capture the
reduction in ownership rates for retired households.
In general the model is able to either match early life ownership rate increases or the
mid-life ownership level. In my calibration I opted for the first since it is more challenging
and the model does quite well even across countries. If one were to match mid-life ownership
rates, ownership rates increase much slower than the data counterpart. Low ownership rates
among the elderly are hard to predict because of life-cycle wealth accumulation. Given the
relatively low retirement income, agents build up large stocks of wealth during the working
years. When agents are wealthy, financing considerations (mortgage rate vs. return/utility
from housing) are secondary. In this case renting is only more attractive when the required
(eq. (II.6)) ownership home (H) is larger than the desired house size consumption.
II.4.2 Heterogenous preferences
In this section I show that heterogeneous housing preferences (different ψ’s) can resolve
some of the model weaknesses outlined in the last section. The basic idea is to consider an
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Figure II.3: Pred. vs. emp. ownership rates
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This figure compares model predicted and empirically observed ownership profiles for the base case de-
scribed in section II.3.1. In particular ψ is fixed at 3.90% for all countries in this calibration.
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Figure II.4: Pred vs. emp ownership rates under heterogeneous preferences
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This figure compares model predicted and empirical ownership profiles assuming heterogeneous housing
preferences (different ψ’s) within a country. From a grid of different types, I choose “interior preferences,”
that is ψ’s for which households do not always rent or always own over the entire life-cycle. From this set
I choose three equidistant rental discounts. Economies are then weighted according to the household size
data in Table II.4. The first two types are weighted using the first two household size frequencies, the last
agent receives the residual weight.
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economy in which homeownership is made up of the tenure choice for agents with different
housing preference. Figure II.4 displays results with heterogeneous agents for the three
countries. Consider, for example, panel (a) which depicts predicted ownership rates under
preference heterogeneity for the US. I assume there are three kinds of agents with ψ values
of 2.90%, 3.70% and 4.50% respectively. The simulation result for an economy with only
the low preference group is represented by a line with square bullets, with only the middle
preference group with a circle bullet line and with only the high housing preference group
with a star bullet line. Combining these three groups in one economy results in an economy
with ownership rates represented by the line labeled “predicted.” The figure shows that
combinations of different housing preferences can lead to predictions that closely resemble
real world data. In particular, the low ownership rate of the elderly can be explained by
the low preference group exiting ownership, while part of the slow increase in ownership
rates can be attributed to the low preference group entering the housing market late.
Whether the combined economy’s ownership profile fits the data depends on the pref-
erence weighting. I believe one major driver of homeownership preferences is family size.
Larger families usually settle down and have to plan long term. Making changes to the
existing house might also be more valuable for families with children. Table II.4 reports
household size frequencies for the three countries. German households are smaller than US
and UK households. 58% of German households are small (households of size two or less)
compared to 48% of US and 50% of UK households. Thus, German household size and the
resulting low ownership preference can be another reason why German households tend to
be renting.
To derive an economy-wide ownership profile, I have to specify the types of heteroge-
neous households I consider. I proceed as follows: First, I generate simulation results for
a grid of housing preferences. Second, I identify those rental discounts (ψ) for which the
simulated ownership profile is not always 0% or always 100%. Third, from these “inte-
rior” simulated economies, I choose an arbitrary number (m = 3) of equidistant economies
which I then combine using weights generated from the family size data in Table II.4.
The weighting is constructed as follows: The first m− 1 economies are weighted with the
first m− 1 household size frequencies from Table II.4, while the last economy receives the
residual weight. The choice of m = 3 appears sensible because single households, couple
households and families are likely to have very different housing preferences.
Figure II.4 displays all ownership profiles obtained in this fashion. US and UK owner-
ship profiles are now close to the data over the entire life-cycle. The German ownership
profile still suffers from similar issues as in the previous section. Even the economy with
low housing preference experiences 100% ownership in mid-life which stands in contrast
to the below 60% maximum ownership rate in the data. The high weighting of the low
preference economy brings the overall prediction closer to the data.
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II.5 Conclusions
This paper studies life-cycle ownership rates across different countries. I use a life-cycle
portfolio choice model to predict cross-country ownership rates. The combination of a
minimum house size, different down payments and income processes results in accept-
able predictions for early-life homeownership for two out of three countries. Predicting
homeownership rates across the whole life-cycle requires the introduction of preference
heterogeneity. I show that different preferences due to family size can lead to sensible
predictions of life-cycle homeownership rates.
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Table II.5: Summary table for cross-country panel data
(a) US
College High School No High School
mean std min max mean std min max mean std min max
Income (k) 65.74 54.59 3.05 2370.00 44.44 23.51 3.02 491.29 33.57 19.93 3.07 223.06
Age 44.52 13.85 19.00 97.00 46.20 16.29 18.00 93.00 55.89 17.85 17.00 96.00
Marital St 0.82 0.39 0.00 1.00 0.83 0.38 0.00 1.00 0.82 0.38 0.00 1.00
Unem. Rate 6.46 1.37 4.20 9.70 6.58 1.40 4.20 9.70 6.83 1.46 4.20 9.70
HH size 2.91 1.35 1.00 11.00 2.88 1.34 1.00 12.00 2.78 1.39 1.00 16.00
Obs 36,054 32,395 19,437
(b) DE
College High School No High School
mean std min max mean std min max mean std min max
Income (k) 41.93 22.63 3.34 276.31 29.50 15.06 3.07 375.92 25.16 12.93 3.11 203.70
Age 50.39 14.37 22.00 95.00 51.27 15.56 19.00 99.00 51.37 15.44 17.00 93.00
Marital St 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00
Unem. Rate 10.19 1.62 7.20 13.00 10.12 1.62 7.20 13.00 10.03 1.61 7.20 13.00
HH size 2.56 1.25 1.00 8.00 2.48 1.18 1.00 13.00 2.66 1.39 1.00 17.00
Obs 17,332 55,641 17,041
(c) UK
College High School No High School
mean std min max mean std min max mean std min max
Income (k) 25.99 14.59 3.00 152.59 21.20 11.47 3.05 213.16 15.86 8.29 3.04 87.79
Age 50.65 15.43 21.00 90.00 48.94 15.94 18.00 95.00 63.43 14.80 19.00 96.00
Marital St 0.88 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.88 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00
Unem. Rate 7.25 1.86 5.10 10.40 7.42 1.87 5.10 10.40 7.55 1.86 5.10 10.40
HH size 3.06 1.26 1.00 8.00 3.11 1.25 1.00 9.00 2.40 1.29 1.00 10.00
Obs 3,367 7,539 7,402
This table displays summary statistics for the PSID, SOEP and BHPS data. For detailed information on
how I merged and harmonized the different data sets see section II.A.
II.A Detailed data description
My empirical analysis is based on PSID data for the US, BHPS data for the UK and SOEP
(Wagner, Gert G., Frick, Joachim R., and Schupp (2007)) data for Germany. Partly, I
can rely on synthesized data from Cross-National Equivalent File (CNEF) described in
Burkhauser, Butrica, Daly, and Lillard (2000). CNEF attempts to facilitate cross-country
studies by harmonizing information from different country-specific panels. However, work-
ing with CNEF and PSID allows me to see how the CNEF and PSID data sets relate,
instead of simply relying on either one and at the same time gives me the flexibility to
include all variables from the survey. Thus, whenever my data needs exceed the data
provided by CNEF, I supplement my dataset with information obtained directly from the
panels.
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In the following I describe, how I set up the three panels in a systematic and symmetric
way allowing me to perform the analysis undertaken in the main text. All three panels
are complex in the sense that data is separated into different files that can be combined
as needed using an identification key. The panels each have particularities, for example
the way the data files are set up or individuals are tracked over time. In the following I
describe the details of how I deal with these particularities and generate one homogeneous
file for each panel. I use $ to denote the current year.
US/PSID Each year the PSID has a family-specific data set (fam$). I combine this data
with the file “ind2005er” which contains all individuals ever surveyed as part of the
PSID up to 2005. Next, I add household head information from CNEF to this data
set and proceed to exclude households with missing or unusable data. While the
individual file carries all households, household dropouts are not in the family file.
I drop all households entering from the individual file and have not participated in
the current year. Then I eliminate households depending on their response status,
represented by the sequence number. A sequence number of zero indicates that the
individual was either born or moved in after the current interview or did not respond
for the current wave or had a mover-out non-response in the previous wave. Further,
I drop households with sequence number 51 or above. These are individuals who
live in institutions, moved out of the household or died before the current interview.
After these adjustments, a few households present in the PSID but absent in CNEF
are left (e.g. 23 households in the year 1980). I drop these households because I lack
the CNEF information. When information for the current household head is missing,
I check whether the data is available for the spouse and replace the spouse as head
if possible. Afterwards I keep only household heads in the data set. Then I remove
possible duplicate household heads by keeping only the male if there is a male and
female household head otherwise arbitrarily keeping the first household head in the
data set. In the PSID, the longitudinal weight is identical to the individual’s cross-
sectional sample weight for the most recent year of the longitudinal sample. Thus
household weights are taken from the CNEF variable “w11102[final year]”.
Germany/SOEP The starting point in constructing the German data set is the SOEP
data file “PPFAD”. It contains information on all households ever contacted as part
of the SOEP survey with their respective unique individual identifier (“PERSNR”).
For each year I merge this information on individuals into the CNEF data set for
that year. Then I analyze the variable “$NETTO” which signals the interview status
of the individual. If the household head is either labeled as child (value 20) or has no
individual interview (value 30) or there is a gap interview for that year (value 31),
I check whether the spouse can be used as a replacement for the household head,
(that is the “$NETTO” value is not equal to 20, 30 or 31) otherwise the household
is dropped. I further drop all individuals who are not the head of a household. Then
I combine all year data sets into one large data set. The resulting data set is then
augmented with the household weighting information from the file “hhrf.” These
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weights some up to the total number of households in Germany. I use longitudinal
household weights from the final survey year to weight the specific household.
UK/BHPS I obtain UK data from the BHPS files “indall” which carries information for
all individuals surveyed in a given year as well as “hhsamp” and “hhresp” where
the first carries technical household information such as the wave specific house-
hold identification number and the second carries information obtained during the
interview process. I connect waves with the so called cross-wave personal identity
number (PID). The household identification number and person identification num-
ber, wHID and wPNO respectively are newly assigned each wave and cannot be
used to obtain longitudinal information. I start from CNEF data and then merge
the file “xwaveid” which maps all individuals (PIDs) on wave-specific information
such as wHID or wPNO. Finally I include year-specific information from “indall”,
“hhsamp” and “hhresp.” I check whether interviews have been successful for head
and/or spouse by checking the variable “ivfio” to be equal to -8 or greater or equal
to 3. If I have no response for the household head, I attempt to use the spouse as
head instead, finally retaining only household heads in the survey. I combine this
individual data with the household data from “hhresp” and eliminate all heads that
cannot be assigned a household in “hgen” (these are usually heads with “Individual
questionnaire, no HH info”($netto = 19)) and households for which I find no corre-
sponding household head (observation in “hresp” cannot be assigned to observation
in main data file) as well as households with children heads (ivfio = 7).
Weighting households that drop out over time is tricky. For all panels I perform the
following adjustment to the weights of a household that dropped out before the end of the
sample. To account for changes in total cross-sectional weights, I use the weight in the
last household response year relative to the sum of weights in that response year as the
longitudinal weight for the drop-out household.
After these adjustments I have one data file for each country containing time series data
on households with the same variables in each file. Now, I apply the same adjustments in
all data sets. I subset data to lie in the period 1980 to 2005. To facilitate the analysis and
to maintain comparability to Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005), I keep only households
with male head. I drop household/year observations for which either the income measure or
the age information is missing and keep only observations with positive weight. Further,
I only include households with 1) income greater 3000 (home currency), 2) at least 3
consecutive time series observations and maximum increase (decrease) in income by 500%
(80%). Especially the income uncertainty estimation is sensitive to outliers in the data.
For this particular estimation I consider only households with at least 10 consecutive time
series observations. Summary statistics for the resulting data files are reported in Table
II.5. The results from regressing income on a set of age dummies and controls are displayed
in Table II.6. The age dummies itself are all highly significant and omitted from the table.
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Table II.6: Regression results
(a) US
College High School No High School
coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat
Intercept 9.97 150.20 9.89 228.56 9.75 216.18
Household size 0.04 6.87 0.06 7.67 0.09 10.51
Marital status 0.37 17.79 0.25 11.39 0.20 6.93
T-bar 11.51 9.78 9.38
σ2ǫ 0.32 0.29 0.30
R2-within 0.26 0.21 0.24
F-stat 23.57 19.94 13.39
n 3,133 3,313 2,073
(b) DE
College High School No High School
coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat
Intercept 10.11 150.70 9.54 230.06 9.37 135.50
Household size 0.07 4.95 0.11 14.82 0.13 9.81
Marital status 0.09 2.90 0.03 1.26 0.03 0.71
T-bar 8.46 8.71 8.69
σ2ǫ 0.26 0.26 0.27
R2-within 0.19 0.15 0.15
F-stat 8.72 16.32 5.62
n 2,049 6,389 1,960
(c) UK
College High School No High School
coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat
Intercept 9.74 63.90 9.36 96.53 9.50 185.95
Household size 0.00 0.02 0.06 3.73 0.12 7.23
Marital status 0.14 2.19 0.05 1.01 0.10 2.02
T-bar 7.34 7.36 8.22
σ2ǫ 0.30 0.29 0.28
R2-within 0.10 0.08 0.10
F-stat 2.07 3.97 4.99
n 459 1,025 900
This table displays the results of fixed effects regression for the US, Germany and the UK. For each
education level and country, log income is regressed on a set of age dummies, household size and marital
status. The resulting age coefficients are omitted in this table. They are used to construct the income
profiles in Figure II.1.
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II.B Solution Technique
As no analytical solution exists, I use numerical methods to solve the model. First I
describe how income normalization allows for state-space reduction and then I describe
the implementation details of the numerical solution.
II.B.1 Income normalization
Given the recursive nature of the problem the inter-temporal problem can be rewritten as
Vt(Ξt) = max
At
{
u(Ct, θ
H
t ) + β Et[Vt+1(Ξt+1)]
}
,
where Ξt is the endogenous state variable (wealth) and At = {θt, Dot } is the vector of
decision variables. Dot is a dummy variable with the value of one in the case of ownership.
Preference homotheticity allows the simplification of the household’s optimization prob-
lem by exploiting the existing scale-independence. In particular, I normalize the problem
by labor income (Yt) so that the relevant state variable is then ξt = Ξt/Yt and denoting
the vector of normalized asset holdings (i.e.
θHt
Yt
,
θMt
Yt
and so on) as ϑt the decision variables
are at = {ϑt, Dot }. The household’s budget constraint, eq. (II.4) becomes
ct = 1 + ξt + ϑ
M
t + ϑ
Ul
t + ϑ
Uh
t − ϑEt −DotϑHt − (1−Dot )αϑHt − ϑBt , (II.7)
where ct = Ct/Yt. The evolution of the normalized endogenous state variable is governed
by
ξt+1 =
Yt
Yt+1
(ϑEt R˜E +D
o
tϑ
H
t RH + ϑ
B
t RL − ϑMt R˜M − ϑUlt RUl − ϑUht RUh). (II.8)
Denote normalized housing consumption ht =
Ht
Yt
, then the normalized value function
vt(ξt) =
Vt(Ξt)
Y
1−γ
t
can be written
vt(ξt) = max
at
{
1
1− γ (c
1−φ
t h
φ
t )
1−γ + β Et
[
vt+1(ξt+1)
(
Yt+1
Yt
)1−γ]}
,
subject to eq. (II.7), eq. (II.8) as well as the following modified versions of the collateral
and borrowing constraint plus the nonnegativity constraint where ςt = ζ/Yt:
ϑHt δ − ϑMt ≥ 0,
−ϑUlt + ςt ≥ 0,
ϑt ≥ 0.
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Figure II.5: Wealth grid US college educated household
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This figure displays the wealth grid for a US, college educated household. The wealth gird is chosen as
follows: The lower and upper bound depend on current expected income growth. I place 75% of the
total 120 grid points between the lower bound and a normalized wealth level of 1.5, spacing the 90 points
equally. Finally, the remaining points are placed between a wealth level of 1.5 and the upper bound and
spaced exponentially.
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II.B.2 Numerical solution
In the numerical solution of the model, I rely on value function iteration instead of the more
commonly used policy function iteration. While both the renter and the owner problem in
the final period are smooth, convex problems, the discrete ownership decision yields kinks
in the value function and thus jumps in the policy function. Using policy functions to store
tomorrow’s choice is thus infeasible.
Numerical solutions require a state space discretization: I compute a discrete Markov
chain to approximate the joint distribution of the stochastic process of equity return and
income. I use the implementation of Tauchen’s method (Tauchen (1986)) proposed in
Knotek, Terry, and II (2008). Tauchen’s method uses quadrature to discretize the state
space. The innovations to equity return, persistent and transitory income shock are each
approximated by two discrete states yielding eight discrete states for numerical integration.
I check that the processes computed by the algorithm match the first two moments for all
three shocks and the persistence θ is between 0.9 and 1.0.
The wealth-income ratio ξt is discretized into a grid of 120 grid points. Figure II.5
displays the final grid I use. The construction of the grid is important to make sure the
algorithm converges. I proceed as follows: First the grid lower and upper bound are chosen
according to expected income growth. This makes sure that I do not attempt to solve the
problem at wealth levels in which the household cannot maintain positive consumption.
Then I choose to place 75% of the wealth points between the lower wealth bound and a
normalized wealth level of 1.5. The remaining 25% of the points are exponentially spaced
between wealth level 1.5 and the wealth upper bound for that particular age. While the
majority of agents face wealth levels between -1 and 10 during the simulation, I need to
be able to assign a policy to the very few agents who accumulate very large amounts of
wealth. During the simulation I check that no agent’s wealth lies outside the proposed
grid. The exponential spacing is convenient because it approximates the distribution of
wealth much better than linear spacing and is thus likely to lead to a more accurate model
solution.
The finite horizon problem can be solved by backward induction. The final period value
and policy can be calculated easily: In the absence of a bequest motive households will
always rent in the last period. In fact the household cannot take on any debt and will
trivially choose not to invest in any asset. The household’s disposable resources are made
up of the final period retirement income plus cash attained through asset holdings. Using
equation (II.5) the budget constraint can be written as
CT + αθ
H
T =
YT−1
(
YT
YT−1
(
ϑET−1R˜E +D
o
tϑ
H
T−1RH + ϑ
B
T−1RL − ϑMT−1R˜M − ϑUlT−1RUl − ϑUhT−1RUh
))
.
(II.9)
Available resources in T are given by the right hand side of eq. (II.9), that is WT ≡
RHS(eq. (II.9)). The intra-temporal problem at age T has the solution {CT , θHT } =
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{WT (1− φ),WT φα}. The value function at time T − 1 is then
VT−1(ξT−1) =
max
aT−1

Y 1−γT−1

 1
1− γ (c
1−φ
T−1h
φ
T−1)
1−γ + β Et

(( CT
YT−1
)1−φ(
HT
YT−1
)φ)1−γ



 ,
where
CT
YT−1
= φ
[
YT
YT−1
+ ϑET−1R˜E +D
o
tϑ
H
T−1RH + ϑ
B
T−1RL − ϑMT−1R˜M − ϑUlT−1RUl − ϑUhT−1RUh
]
.
Iterating backwards from age T , I obtain the optimal policy and value performing two
separate optimizations, one conditional on ownership and one conditional on renting. I
choose the tenure with higher value as optimal policy. The optimization is done with
the optimization software “IPOPT” (Interior Point Optimizer) described in Wa¨chter and
Biegler (2006). For several “test” parameter combinations, I check that the optimizer
DONLP2 (Spellucci (1999)) yields the same result.
The selection of starting points is crucial for the convergence of the optimizer. My
general approach is to choose asset holdings to equalize the distance of next period’s wealth
to its lower bound and the distance of today’s consumption to zero. This general approach
works very well for this problem. The precise selection of starting points depends on the
household tenure:
For renters, first, stock holdings are chosen in the above way and bounded at 0.001
below. Then I find investments in the uncollateralized asset with low interest rate which
are bounded by 0.999 above. Finally I choose the uncollateralized asset at the high rate.
My initial guess for household rent expenditure is α
1+ξt−ϑEt +ϑ
H
t RUL+ϑ
H
t RUH
θ
.
For owners, first I choose housing investments to be θinitialH = H+0.001. Then uncollat-
eralized borrowing is selected as in the renter case. If my asset choice implies next period’s
wealth above the wealth grid’s upper bound, I simultaneously scale down stock holdings
and home size by 1% increments. This choice of starting points leads to convergence on
the whole grid for all computed parameter combinations in the state space.
Again referring to Figure II.5, I do the dual optimization for all nodes of the final
age. I fill the gaps between neighboring nodes with tension splines. In particular, I use
“TSPACK” (Tension Spline and Curve Fitting Package) described in Renka (1993) to
obtain the continuous approximation of today’s value and policy functions. Whenever the
solver attempts to evaluate the value function outside of the grid (below or above), I use
a first-order Taylor expansion to extrapolate the true value function. Equipped with this
approximation of the value function, I proceed to compute the value and optimal policy
at the previous age and then iterating backwards until age t = 1.
After computing solutions at all nodes, I use the optimal policies to simulate economies
of size 10, 000 for each education level weighting the resulting economies with the number
of households in the specific education group as reported in the country’s panel.
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Part III
International Diversification and the
Forward Premium
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Time-Varying
International Diversification
and the Forward Premium
Benjamin Jonen, Simon Scheuring∗
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Abstract
This paper reproduces the slope of the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) regres-
sion for ten country pairs within one standard deviation under rational expectations.
We propose an infinite horizon dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with
incomplete markets. Heterogeneous investors experience varying risk aversion as a
result of habit formation.
The underlying mechanism of the model relies on varying international diver-
sification in the investors’ portfolio choice decision. In response to their changing
habit levels, investors’ hedging desire varies over time. This leads to adjustments
in interest rates. The habit-induced investment decisions are negatively correlated
with movements in the exchange rate. This results in a negative correlation between
interest rates and expected exchange rates, as implied by a negative UIP slope.
Depending on the magnitude of habits, the model is capable of reproducing pos-
itive as well as negative UIP slopes, as seen empirically in the data.
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III.1 Introduction
A large body of empirical literature1 finds that high interest currencies tend to appreciate.
This is surprising, since it implies that investors in high yield currencies benefit twice,
once from the interest rate spread and once from the expected appreciation. Standard
economic models predict exactly the opposite, namely that the uncovered interest rate
parity (UIP) holds: high interest currencies should depreciate. The empirical phenomenon,
usually referred to as the forward premium anomaly, is one of the most prevalent puzzles
in international finance and has also given rise to the great popularity of carry trades2.
Given the complexity and resilience of the puzzle3, financial economists have been
searching for a potential explanation ever since its discovery. Approaches toward a the-
oretical explanation emerge from three major directions: irrational expectations, market
frictions or rational risk premia. This paper develops a two-country model under rational
expectations without market frictions, attributing the forward premium to time-varying
risk premia.
We assume that consumers form habits according to their consumption history. This
changes the price of risk over time. When consumption drops close to the habit level,
marginal utility increases and implied risk aversion rises. Contrarily, a large wedge between
consumption and habit implies small risk aversion. Without habit, expected exchange rate
(FX) appreciations always translate into a falling interest differential (confirm UIP). The
introduction of habit induces shifts in investors’ international diversification: Investors
purchase foreign assets to hedge their consumption risk. The desire to hedge varies with
different levels of income. Therefore, interest rate differentials carry time-varying risk
premia for consumption growth. These risk premia are negatively correlated with FX
returns. Thus, for sufficiently high habit levels, expected exchange rate appreciations can
lead to increasing interest rate differentials (contradict UIP), as seen in the data.
The model’s exchange rate is the ratio between tradable good prices in the two countries.
We therefore assume Purchasing Power Parity holds for the tradable part of agents’ income.
This allows the model to generate realistic levels of inflation and FX returns simultaneously.
Markets are assumed to be incomplete on the international level. There is no asset that
directly enables the representative investors to insure their income risk. This assumption
is necessary to prevent countries from completely aggregating their individual risk, i.e.
consume a constant percentage of the global income in tradable goods. The emerging
country-specific consumption uncertainty impacts risk premia: they become larger and
more varying, across time as well as across countries.
1The discovery is attributed to Hansen and Hodrick (1980) and Fama (1984). For surveys see Hodrick
(1987) and Engel (1996).
2Carry trade refers to the strategy of borrowing in low interest currencies while investing in high interest
currencies.
3For a survey see Engel (1996). Important theoretical contributions include: Alvarez, Atkeson, and
Kehoe (2009), Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2010), Bansal and Shaliastovich (2009), Bekaert (1996),
Colacito (2006), Farhi and Gabaix (2008), Verdelhan (2010) and most recently Heyerdahl-Larsen (2012).
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With habit levels common in the literature4, we are able to reproduce the forward
premium anomaly for ten different country pairs, composed of the five countries Australia,
Germany, Japan, United Kingdom and United States. For eight out of those ten countries,
the match is almost perfect, and for the remaining two the model remains within one
standard deviation of the empirical observation.
This paper is related to the work of Verdelhan (2010). Verdelhan provides an expla-
nation to the forward premium in the Campbell and Cochrane (1999) habit framework.
He combines pro-cyclical interest rates with habit driven counter-cyclical risk aversion to
replicate the anomaly. One restriction of his approach is that consumption has to be ex-
ogenous. In an international model, this implies the absence of trade, which Verdelhan
achieves by assuming sufficiently large transportation costs. In the appendix, Verdelhan
takes a first step toward a more diversified model, by reducing transportation cost and
solving the planner’s problem for the two countries. This paper takes the next step, by
abandoning the planer and solving for a competitive equilibrium.
Thus, similarly to Verdelhan, we attribute the forward premium to rational risk pre-
mia, which vary over time due to habit formation. In our model, however, consumption
is endogenous. We therefore allow for trade and international investment decisions. Theo-
retically, this allows for feedback effects between the two countries and generally for richer
dynamics within the model. Empirically, it allows to replicate more and different moments.
Most notably, we account for the low correlation between consumption and FX returns,
commonly referred to as the Backus and Smith (1993) puzzle. Backus observes a discon-
nect between consumption and real exchange rates. Since asset prices crucially depend on
correlation, matching this low correlation makes it very challenging to generate large and
fluctuating risk premia. To our knowledge, this is the first model to account for the Backus
and Smith (1993) puzzle (although in its nominal version), while matching negative UIP
slope coefficients in a rational expectation framework.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section two, we present our model,
followed by a description of our numerical solution method in section three. In section
four we describe our calibration. Section five discusses our model results and section six
concludes.
III.2 The model
III.2.1 General setup
Real economy
This model describes an exchange economy of two infinitely lived countries, in which each
country is endowed with two types of nondurable consumption goods, one tradable, one
nontradable. Each country is represented by one agent5. In each period, agents receive a
4Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Verdelhan (2010).
5We name them agent H and agent F and they reside in country 1 and country 2.
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share φ of their endowments in the tradable good yTG,t = φyt and a share 1 − φ in the
nontradable good yNG,t = (1 − φ)yt. The agents consider the foreign tradable good as a
perfect substitute for the domestic tradable good and possess Cobb-Douglas preferences
over the two consumption goods,
u(cTG,t, cNG,t) =
2
1− γ
(
cψTG,tc
1−ψ
NG,t
)1−γ
,
where γ refers to the risk aversion and ψ to the preference for tradables. For ease of
notation we refer to the vector of consumption ct = (cTG,t, cNG,t), whenever an explicit
distinction between tradables and non-tradables is not necessary.
Financial economy
Each country has separate exogenous price levels, determining the relative value of the
currency. We measure the price level in terms of the nominal price of the tradable good
in each country.6 In addition, we assume that goods and assets can only be traded in
the currency of the home country. Furthermore, we assume that Purchasing Power Parity
(PPP) holds for tradable goods, thus determining the nominal exchange rate as
St =
p1,t
p2,t
,
where p1,t and p2,t refer to the price levels (e.g. prices of tradables) in the two countries.
7
Each country issues a one-period bond with no possibility to default. Denoting prices
and nominal holdings of bonds, issued by country i by qi,t and Bi,t respectively, and intro-
ducing a superscript to identify the country that chooses the economic variable, the home
country’s nominal budget constraint can be written as
CHTG,t ≤ WHt + Y HTG,t − q1,tBH1,t − q2,tBH2,t,
where WHt = B
H
1,t−1 + StB
H
2,t−1 represents nominal wealth of country H. For this wealth,
we assume a constant boundary on real debt
q1,tB1,t + Stq2,tB2,t
p1,t
≥ w¯H .
6Prices of non-tradables have no impact on agents’ decisions in our model.
7Given the empirical evidence on absolute and relative PPP it cannot be claimed that PPP holds for
a general basket of goods. Burstein, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2005), however, show that PPP holds ap-
proximately for tradables, if one chooses the definition of tradable good appropriately. In particular, they
distinguish between production and distribution of tradable goods. They argue that distribution is essen-
tially nontradable. Based on this distinction they show empirically that even in times of extreme exchange
rate fluctuations PPP holds approximately for tradables. Note that our model results are insensitive in
the share of tradables in total income.
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Figure III.1: Illustration of the market setup
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This figure illustrates our model setup. Two countries trade consumption goods for nominal zero bonds,
which are affected by stochastic price levels.
Uncertainty
Uncertainty enters the model through real and monetary shocks, where zt denotes the vec-
tor of all such shocks. Shocks follow a first order Markov process with transition function
Π(zt+1|zt). Real shocks change the endowment of consumption good (yNG,t(zt), yTG,t(zt))
available to each country, whereas monetary shocks change the inflation rate in each coun-
try. This has two important implications. Firstly, monetary shocks determine the exchange
rate through PPP. Secondly, although countries cannot default on their bonds, stochastic
inflation implies a real consumption risk of holding bonds.
Note that the financial economy consists of only two bonds. Therefore, markets are
generically incomplete.
Summary
Figure III.1 summarizes our model setup. Consider two countries, for example the United
States and Japan. Each country has a stochastic income in its own good, a distinct currency
and issues a nominally riskless zero bond. The United States sell some of their goods to
Japan, while the Japanese issue bonds as a promise to repay in the future and vice versa.
In equilibrium the net financial transactions will always equal the net real transactions.
Risk enters the model on the real side through stochastic income and on the financial
side through stochastic inflation rates in each country, affecting the real payouts of the
nominally secure bonds.
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III.2.2 Habit utility
We assume investors value consumption only beyond their current habit level. The utility
function, now supplemented by an external habit level8, can be written as
u(ct, ht) = u(ct − ht) = u(cTG,t − hTG,t, cNG,t − hNG,t).
Following Constantinides (1990), Ferson and Constantinides (1991) and Heaton (1995)
we specify investors’ habit process9 as a weighted average of past consumption, recursively
written as
ht+1 = ρht + ηct. (III.1)
For simplicity we consider the same habit level for tradables and nontradable goods,
where we take nontradable consumption as a proxy for aggregate consumption in each
country.10
This specification of habit increases the local curvature of the utility function, and
thus, increases the risk aversion of agents. Moreover, risk aversion changes as agents
experience different shocks to endowment. In times of consumption levels close to habit
levels, marginal utilities are large and agents very risk averse. Contrarily, in times, when
consumption is much higher than habit, marginal utilities are relatively small and the price
of risk is low. Thus, habit formation allows for large, time varying risk premia.
Instead of calibrating the habit process parameters directly, we focus on the first two
unconditional moments of the habit process, E[h] and V[h]). They are more intuitive than
the parameters of the habit process (IV.5). The original parameters are then given by
ρ =
E[h]2
E[c]2
V[c]− V[h]
E[h]2
E[c]2
V[c] + V[h]
, (III.2)
η = (1− ρ)E[h]
E[c]
,
where E refers to the unconditional expectation and V to the unconditional variance.
8The literature distinguishes internal from external habit. We follow Abel (1990) in the use of external
habit formation, commonly referred to as “catching up with the Joneses”.
9Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and Verdelhan (2010) use a nonlinear, reverse engineered habit process,
which has interesting implications in their framework. However, in our opinion, Constantinides’s modelling
of habit is the economically more intuitive choice.
10The good-specific habit levels are then formed as fractions of the aggregate habit level proportionally
to the amount of tradables and nontradables in the economy.
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III.2.3 Optimization problem
The optimization problem for each agent is
max
Ct,B1,t,B2,t
∞∑
t=0
δtu(ct, ht), (III.3)
subject to the budget constraint, the law of motion of wealth and the borrowing constraint.
We seek a competitive equilibrium, that is a sequence of asset prices qt = (q1,t, q2,t) and
portfolio holdings Bt = (B1,t, B2,t)
11, such that given qt, the choice of Bt solves (III.3),
subject to the agents’ individual constraints and market clearing.
For each agent we can rewrite the sequence problem into the corresponding recursive
problem. Define zt = (π
H
t , π
F
t , Y
H
t , Y
F
t ), Ψt = (Wt, zt, ht), then
Vt(Ψt) = max
Ct,B1,t,B2,t
u(ct − ht) + δ Et[Vt+1(Ψt+1)], (III.4)
subject to
CNG,t ≤ YNG,t,
CTG,t ≤ Wt + YTG,t − q1,tB1,t − q2,tB2,t,
Wt+1 = B1,t + St+1B2,t,
p1,tw¯
H ≤ q1,tB1,t + Stq2,tB2,t
In addition, we impose the following market clearing conditions:
Bonds are in zero net supply
BH1,t + B
F
1,t = 0,
BH2,t + B
F
2,t = 0.
Nontradable goods cannot be traded
cHNG,t − yHNG,t = 0,
cFNG,t − yFNG,t = 0.
Aggregate consumption in tradables is equal to aggregate endowments
cHTG,t + c
F
TG,t − yHTG,t − yFTG,t = 0.
11Through the budget constraint, portfolio holdings imply a consumption path.
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III.2.4 Model dynamics
Incomplete markets
The only financial assets in the model are the two bonds. As they fall short of spanning
the state space, markets are incomplete. Completing markets would require to introduce
assets, which allow to directly insure income risk. Such assets usually do not exist in the real
world. In addition, the possibility to directly insure income risk would have undesirable
model implications. In the first period, the agents would negotiate to fully share their
income streams. I.e. each agent would receive a constant share of the global income in
tradables.
Avoiding this unrealistic implication has three impacts on risk premia: they grow larger,
more volatile and differ more strongly across countries. All these features are helpful in
explaining the forward premium anomaly quantitatively.12
Reproducing the negative slope coefficient
Figure III.2 displays the underlying mechanism in our model. The objective is to reproduce
the empirical observation that E[∆s] is negatively correlated with iH − iF . Starting from
an innovation in the income process, two major channels link exchange rates and interest
rate differentials. The first channel we call the UIP effect. It is the effect found in a
standard economic model compatible with a slope coefficient of one.13 The second channel
is novel to our model and depends on the time-varying risk aversion induced by investors’
habit formation. Changing hedging needs have the potential to reduce the slope coefficient
and even make it negative. Depending on the correlation between income growth and
the exchange rate, both channels have slightly different dynamics. In the majority of
countries income growth is correlated with FX appreications, but in some countries with
depreciations. Therefore both cases are relevant.
Negative correlation
The middle part of Figure III.2 displays the case when income growth is correlated with
an appreciation of the home currency (E[∆s] ↓)14. Clearly, investors anticipate a currency
gain and will therefore demand a lower interest rate on home bonds (iH ↓). This is the
first channel or UIP effect. The second channel is novel and provides the explanation for
the existence of the forward premium. In addition to the direct effect of a positive income
shock on expected exchange rates, a positive income shock also induces more consumption
increasing habit formation and thus risk aversion.15 This stimulates the home country’s
12See Engel (1996).
13See among many others: Fama and Farber (1979), Lucas (1982), Hodrick and Srivastava (1984),
Hodrick and Srivastava (1986) and Engel (1992).
14Throughout the paper, we use the standard convention of denoting currencies as HOME
FOREIGN
, therefore
a decrease in the currency is equivalent to a appreciation.
15Risk aversion rises because habit reacts more strongly than expected consumption in our calibration.
This effect is related to the question of how relative risk aversion reacts to changes in wealth. This has been
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Figure III.2: Illustration of the central mechanism
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This figure illustrates how the negative slope coefficient is reproduced in the model.
The upper panel states an equivalent formulation to a negative slope coefficient in the UIP regression.
When the interest rate differential goes up, the expected exchange rate has to appreciate (E[∆s] ↓).
The middle panel shows how the puzzle can be resolved, when there is a negative correlation between
exchange rates and income growth. The upper causality chain restates the standard UIP. The lower
causality chain shows how this can be overcome by habit induced time-varying risk aversion.
The lower panel shows how the puzzle can be resolved, when there is a positive correlation between
exchange rates and income growth. Again, the upper chain displays the UIP and the lower our habit
induced risk aversion effect.
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demand for foreign bonds, reduces the foreign interest rate and thus leads to a larger
interest rate differential.
If the second effect quantitatively outweighs the first effect, this provides a possible
explanation for the forward premium. The home currency appreciates at the same time as
the interest rate differential increases.
Positive correlation
The bottom part of Figure III.2 displays the case when income growth is correlated
with a depreciation of the home currency. Investors expect a depreciation of the home
currency now. Therefore, they will demand a higher interest rate on home bonds to com-
pensate for the expected decline in the purchasing power of their investment return. That
is, according to standard theory, an FX depreciation is followed by an increasing interest
differential. The mechanics of the second channel are almost identical to the negative cor-
relation case. Higher income growth leads to habit formation and increasing risk aversion.
Investors hedging desire rises. In contrast to the former case, now home assets provide a
hedge against consumption risk. The interest differential falls as investors buy home bonds.
Since both channels change signs, the negative slope coefficient can also be reproduced in
the positive correlation case.
In summary, international diversification allows investors to hedge some of their income
risk. As a result of income fluctuation and peoples’ habit formation, the desire for inter-
national diversification fluctuates over time. The interest rate movements induced by this
time-varying hedging desire has the potential to mitigate the UIP effect. Depending on
the relative strength of both effects, the model can replicate a negative correlation between
interest rate differential and expected exchange rates.
III.3 Computation
The dynamic programming problem (III.4) cannot be solved analytically. We therefore
proceed to solve it computationally following methods in Judd (1998). To obtain a numer-
ical solution the problem has to be discretized to a finite number of shocks. In practice this
translates into approximating the estimated processes (i.e. income and exchange rate pro-
cess for each country) by a discrete shock vector and an associated transition matrix. We
simply follow the standard choice in the literature and use an implementation of Tauchen’s
algorithm (Tauchen (1986), Tauchen and Hussey (1991)).
We discretize the habit process into a discrete number of habit states. At the beginning
of each period, habit is computed according to (IV.5). If the resulting value does not lie
on the grid, we replace the computed value with the habit grid’s closest node.
an ongoing debate in the literature. However, recent evidence supports Arrow’s original hypothesis (Arrow
(1965) and Arrow (1970)) that relative risk aversion rises with higher wealth. See Halek and Eisenhauer
(2001), Holt and Laury (2002) and Guiso and Paiella (2008).
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Equipped with shock and transition matrices, the remaining relevant state space can
be summarized by one endogenous state variable, net wealth of agent A. It summarizes the
past actions of agent A. Wealth of agent B can simply be deduced through market clearing.
Given the relevant state space of the economy, we use standard dynamic programming
techniques to solve for the competitive equilibrium.
In particular we iterate over the agent’s consumption policy. For the initial policy
agents roll-over almost all of their debt, i.e. indebted agents pay back only a small amount
of their loan in a two-period model. Then, in each step of the time iteration, we solve
the nonlinear system of equations (see Appendix III.B.3, page 71) on a finite grid over net
wealth and subsequently approximate the new consumption policy with cubic splines.
There is no theorem guaranteeing the convergence to or even the existence of a policy
function satisfying the dynamic programming problem.16 However, as long as we observe
convergence toward a policy function, we know that it is a solution to the infinite horizon
dynamic programming problem within the computational margin of error17.
Finally, we simulate a large number of exogenous shocks for income and exchange rates
and compute possible outcomes of the economy given the optimal policy functions. We
perform the interest parity regression on the simulated data to test for the slope and
observe additional implications of our model on various economic and financial variables.
III.4 Calibration
To assess our model’s power to explain the forward premium anomaly, we calibrate the
model to data for various countries. The set of countries, picked by historic economic
significance, comprises Australia (AU), Germany (DE), Japan (JP), United Kingdom (UK)
and the United States (US). The analysis puts special emphasis on the country pair United
States and Japan, since these are the two largest economies, representing two dominant
currencies; and most importantly as the anomaly is particularly robust for this country
pair18.
III.4.1 Data sources
For the calibration of our model, we need income growth, exchange rates, interest rates
and trade shares. Except for trade shares, all data analysis is on the period from 1980 to
2010.
Income growth data is seasonally adjusted, in real terms and quarterly frequency and
16For a discussion see Duffie, Geanakoplos, Mas-Colell, and McLennan (1994) and Kubler and Schmed-
ders (2005).
17The maximum deviations we allowed for were 10−10 for each individual FOC and 10−7 for the maximum
change in consumption policies.
18Han (2004) performs a large cross-country, cross-period comparison to test whether the anomaly
is universal. Performing regressions for varying time horizons in the range 1979 to 1998, he finds the
percentage of observed negative beta coefficients to be 96% for the US and Japan.
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provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Eu-
rostat and the Reserve Bank Australia.
Exchange rates are from Thomson Reuters Datastream and Eurostat, where we take
the first day of each quarter in order to match quarterly income data. For the case of
Germany we simply take the Euro as a proxy for Deutsche Mark.
As interest rates, we use 90 days Eurocurrency rates, again from Datastream. For
Australia, there was no Eurocurrency rate available, thus we use “Interest rate on Bank
accepted bills” as provided by the Reserve Bank Australia.
Finally, we obtain trade shares for the year 1999 from the World Trade Organisa-
tion, “Share of goods and commercial services in the total trade of selected regions and
economies. ”
III.4.2 Currency baskets
To calibrate the Markov chain, we need inflation and income data. While income data is
readily available, tradable good inflation is not. Broad price indices, such as the Consumer
Price Index (CPI), are not suitable since they incorporate both tradable and nontradable
prices. More seriously, the usage of these indices would result in a model-implied exchange
rate process that is completely different from the one observed in the data. This stands in
sharp contrast to the paper’s main goal of explaining the relationship between exchange
rates and interest rates.
To avoid the above issues connected with price indices, we exploit the fact that the
relation between tradable good prices in two countries is given as the exchange rate under
PPP. More precisely, tradable good inflation in one country is measured as the valution
of that country’s currency against a broad index of other countrys’ currencies. For each
currency pair, we construct a currency basket of all remaining countries.19 Tradable good
inflation for one country is then derived as a weighted average of exchange rates of this
country to all other countries in the basket. More formally, for a given country pair a, b,
tradable good inflation is given as
Πj =
∑
∀i 6=a,b
wiS
i,j j = a, b,
where wi is the weight of currency i in the basket and S
i,j is the price of currency j in
terms of currency i.
We choose the weights as the shares on world trade. More precisely, the relative value
of the sum of each country’s aggregate imports and exports with country i. As an example
the currency basket for the country - pair US - JP is displayed in Table III.1. From here
on, we will refer to the tradable good inflation process of a country simply as the country’s
(basket) exchange rate.
19It is convenient to exclude both countries in the basket in order to still obtain an exact match of the
exchange rate when applying PPP.
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Table III.1: Reference currency basket — Japan - US
Country AU CA CH DE DK FR NL NO SE SG UK
Share 3.3 11.9 4.6 24.8 2.6 14.5 9.8 2.5 4.0 6.2 15.7
This table shows the composition of the reference currency basket for the country pair Japan -
US. 1999 trade shares, obtained from WTO, are normalized such that they sum up to 100.
III.4.3 Estimation of exogeneous state variables
Equipped with the exchange rate process for each country, we can estimate the majority
of the model parameters from data. In particular we estimate the exogenous shocks to
income and inflation with a Vector Autoregressive Regression (VaR) of order one as(
∆yt
∆st
)
=
(
α1
α2
)
+
(
θy θy,s
θs,y θs
)(
∆yt−1
∆st−1
)
+
(
ǫt,y
ǫt,s
)
, (III.5)
where ∆y and ∆s refer to the change in logs of income and exchange rates against the
currency basket, α and θ are the estimated coefficients and ǫ residuals.
Inflation of tradables — persistence
Table III.2:
Persistence of FX returns
Ctry1 Ctry2 Pers. Pval
AU DE -0.01 0.89
AU JP 0.07 0.38
AU UK -0.05 0.52
AU US 0.07 0.38
DE JP 0.11 0.20
DE UK 0.09 0.34
DE US 0.09 0.35
JP UK 0.13 0.11
JP US 0.06 0.49
UK US 0.16 0.05
Persistence estimates and p-values of
log returns on exchange rates over
different currency pairs.
It turns out empirically that the coefficients θy,s and θs
are universally insignificant. Thus, none of the analyzed
countries show signs of significant persistence in nominal
exchange rate returns. Table III.2 displays the persis-
tence estimates and p-values for the ten different bas-
ket currencies analysed in our model. Only one currency
comes close to the significance threshold. Therefore we
simply set these values for all countries to zero. Arguably,
this assumption makes a difference for our model econ-
omy. Without it, a second channel for a direct payoff ef-
fect opens up, working against the above proposed habit
effect. However, in our opinion, the empirical evidence
legitimates the assumption of zero exchange rate persis-
tence.
Markov chain approximation
The remaining results of the VaR regression (III.5) need
to be discretized to accomodate our model. Therefore
we discretize the process for each country into a Markov
chain with 9 states. Table III.3 displays various statistics describing the result of the em-
pirical estimation for the country pair US - JP, showing the high quality of the Markov
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Table III.3: Markov chain approximation — Japan - US
Ctry Parameter Data [s.e.] Model
JP
FX returns
Mean E[∆s] 1.009 0.005 1.009
Std. σ[∆s] 0.055 0.004 0.044
Income
Mean E[∆y] 1.005 0.001 1.005
Std. σ[∆y] 0.011 0.001 0.009
Pers. θy 0.233 0.093 0.166
Corr. ρ∆s,∆y -0.208 0.089 -0.207
US
FX returns
Mean E[∆s] 0.998 0.004 0.998
Std. σ[∆s] 0.045 0.003 0.035
Income
Mean E[∆y] 1.007 0.001 1.007
Std. σ[∆y] 0.009 0.000 0.007
Pers. θy 0.350 0.074 0.254
Corr. ρ∆s,∆y -0.030 0.079 -0.030
This table compares the first moments of the Markov chain approximation for the two exogenous process
FX returns and income growth to actual data.
chain approximation. There are some minor deviations in standard deviations and persis-
tences due to the discretization, but correlation is matched precisely. Similar accuracy is
achieved for all other country pairs.
III.4.4 Remaining parameters
Some parameters, especially preference parameters cannot easily be estimated from data.
Table III.4 summarizes the remaining parameters. The parameters in the top panel are
picked while the parameters in the lower panel are calibrated: They are chosen as to
minimize the distance between the model simulated and the empirical forward premium
Table III.4: Calibrated parameters
Parameter (Quarterly) Value
Share of tradables φ 0.50
Discount factor δ 0.99
Risk aversion γ 2.00
Preference for tradables ψ 0.50
Average habit level E[h] 0.93
Habit volatitility σ[h] 0.0057
57
regression’s slope coefficients.
The share of tradables in each country is set to 0.520, the discount factor to 0.99 on a
quarterly horizon and finally the relative risk aversion to 2.00.
The habit parameterization is reported in the bottom panel. The average habit level
is 0.93 and the habit volatility is 0.0057, roughly half the value of income volatility. This
reflects the fact that habit is implicitly driven by changes in income, yet varies less than
income.
III.5 Results
III.5.1 Simulation
Given agents’ optimal policies, we simulate the model economy. The lower panel of Table
III.5 displays the intercept and slope coefficient of a UIP regression using our model econ-
omy’s data and corresponding actual data for the country pair US - JP. Our model matches
both the slope and the intercept almost within one standard deviation. The theoretical
values of the model are an approximation to the simulated value.21
The upper panel of Table III.5 shows the correlation between consumption growth and
FX returns. It is known as the Backus and Smith (1993) puzzle (for real exchange rates),
that these correlations are surprisingly low or even positive although standard economic
theory would predict them to be close to -1.
Correlations are crucial in any explanation related to risk premia. Correlation directly
affects covariances, which determine the stochastic discount factor and thus risk premia.
Therefore, the capacity of our model to account for these low correlations is an important
advantage over other risk-premia related explanations such as Bansal and Shaliastovich
(2009) or Verdelhan (2010).
III.5.2 Impact of habit
Varying habit levels
Figure III.3 displays the impact of the local curvature, as implied by average risk aversion22,
on the slope coefficient for three different levels of habit volatility.23 In the case of relatively
small habit levels the model simply reproduces the uncovered interest parity, i.e. β ≈ 1.
20Burstein, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2005) estimated the share of nontradables for ten different coun-
tries and found values between 0.31 and 0.57.
21For comparison and plotting purposes, it is inconvenient to use simulated slope coefficients, because
of the introduced standard errors. Therefore, for the purpose of the regression, we make the assumption
that ǫt+1 is uncorrelated with time t expectations (The violation of this assumption is induced by the
discretization of the state space). This allows us to compute approximate, yet exact slope coefficients, see
Fama (1984).
22Local curvature is given by γ
c−h
.
23The three curves have different starting values for local curvature, since combining high volatilities
with low average habit levels results in negative habit persistences ρ (see (IV.6) on page 80).
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Table III.5: Empirical versus model implied — Japan - US
Parameter (Quarterly) Data s.e. Model (sim.) s.e. Model (th.)
ρJP∆s,∆c 0.22 [0.08] 0.13 [0.01]
ρUS∆s,∆c −0.10 [0.08] −0.06 [0.01]
αUIP 0.03 [0.01] 0.02 [0.01] 0.02
βUIP −0.63 [0.25] −0.36 [0.15] −0.38
The first panel compares the model implied correlation (ρ) between real consumption growth (∆c)
and FX returns (∆s) with the data. Consumption growth and FX returns are on a quarterly basis. FX
returns are denoted as home over foreign, so for Japan as ¥$ and for US as
$
¥
.
The second panel compares the results of the UIP regression. αUIP refers to the intercept and βUIP to
the slope. We report two model values. The actual simulated value with standard errors and a theoretical
approximation, which we use for plotting and calibration.
Figure III.3: UIP slope coefficient — Japan - US
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This figure displays the UIP slope for the country pair Japan - US over local curvature, as implied by
average habit. The three lines represent different levels of habit volatility.
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The UIP effect dominates because the habit level is too small to create large enough risk
premia.
Figure III.4: Local curvature
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Avg. habit
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Lo
ca
l c
ur
va
tu
re
For a constant level of habit, i.e. zero habit
volatility (the solid line), the UIP channel still dom-
inates. Only at high local curvatures the habit chan-
nel starts to play a role and slowly reduces the slope
coefficient. However, the coefficient remains close to
one.24 Note, that a constant habit level does not im-
ply constant risk aversion. Since consumption varies,
so does the spread c−h and thus the local curvature.
The two dotted lines in Figure 3 display cases
of nonzero habit volatility. These correspond to pa-
rameterizations in which consumption shocks impact
next period’s habit level (i.e. ν 6= 0). As average
habit levels and thus risk aversion rise, the habit
induced international diversification effect becomes increasingly important and finally out-
weighs the UIP effect. For a habit volatility of 0.003, high habit levels drive the slope
coefficient down to 0. For a habit volatility of 0.006, the model predicts negative slope
coefficients for average habit levels around 0.9 (i.e. an implied local curvature of 20, see
Figure III.4).
III.5.3 Multiple countries
In addition to the detailed analysis for the country pair US - Japan, we apply our two-
country model to nine other country pairs. These are formed by pairwise combination
of Australia (AU), Germany (DE), Japan (JP), United Kingdom (UK) and the United
States (US). Initially, we estimate a Markov chain for each country pair as described in
the calibration section, then we solve for optimal policies and compute the model implied
UIP slope coefficient. Finally, we compare these slopes to the data.
We explore three calibration scenarios. In the first scenario we pick a common habit
calibration for both countries, i.e E[h1] = E[h2] and σ[h1] = σ[h2]. The objective is to show
that our model is in principle capable of explaining the observed forward premium for each
country pair. In the second scenario, each country has its own habit parameterization,
which is the same across country pairs. The idea is to infer country preferences and show
that the model is able to explain the puzzle for all country pairs simultaneously. In the
third calibration scenario we challenge the model with a habit process constant across all
countries.
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Table III.6: UIP slope coefficient — separate calibration
Ctry1 Ctry2 E[h] σ[h] Model β Emp. β s.e.
AU DE 0.85 0.0006 0.25 0.25 [0.21]
AU JP 0.84 0.0074 0.12 0.10 [0.27]
AU UK 0.81 0.0070 -0.19 -0.19 [0.23]
AU US 0.95 0.0043 -0.04 -0.04 [0.17]
DE JP 0.88 0.0054 0.12 0.12 [0.29]
DE UK 0.82 0.0026 0.27 0.27 [0.18]
DE US 0.96 0.0024 -0.04 -0.03 [0.21]
JP UK 0.90 0.0068 -0.68 -1.05 [0.38]
JP US 0.93 0.0057 -0.39 -0.63 [0.25]
UK US 0.96 0.0029 -0.04 -0.04 [0.19]
This table reports the empirical vs. model implied slope coefficient for the calibration case: one habit
parametrization per country pair. The first two columns refer to the country pair. The next two columns
to the common habit preferences for each country pair. Finally, the last three columns compare the model
implied value to the empirical observation.
Separate calibration — one habit parameterization per country pair
Table III.6 shows the result for a country pair specific habit calibration. Each country pair
is analyzed separately. We assume the same habit parameterization for the two countries.
The first two columns refer to the countries, the next two columns to the common habit
parameterization. In the last three columns we compare the model implied slope coefficient
with the empirically observed slope coefficient.
For the majority of country pairs the match is almost exact. Exceptions are Japan -
US and Japan - UK. The model has difficulties reproducing these highly negative slope
coefficients. Still the model implied β remains within one standard deviation for every
country pair.
Simultaneous calibration — one habit parameterization per country
In this calibration, each country is assigned its own habit calibration. That is, we pick an
average habit level and a habit volatility for each country to match the slope coefficients
for all country pairs simultaneously. Each country has the same habit parameterization,
independent of which country it is compared to. The results are reported in Table III.7.
The first two columns refer to the country pairs. The next four columns display the habit
parameterization for country 1 and country 2, respectively. Finally, the last three columns
compare the model implied slope coefficient to the empirical observation.
Note that each country keeps its average habit and habit volatility across different
country pairs. The introduced interdependencies between the different country pairs make
24The model becomes numerically unstable for implied local curvatures above 25. We therefore cannot
report model solutions for higher levels.
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Table III.7: UIP slope coefficient — simultaneous calibration
Ctry1 Ctry2 E[h1] σ[h1] E[h2] σ[h2] Model β Emp. β s.e.
AU DE 0.86 0.0034 0.95 0.0041 -0.05 0.25 [0.21]
AU JP 0.86 0.0034 0.88 0.0051 0.10 0.10 [0.27]
AU UK 0.86 0.0034 0.95 0.0044 -0.07 -0.19 [0.23]
AU US 0.86 0.0034 0.97 0.0038 0.17 -0.04 [0.17]
DE JP 0.95 0.0041 0.88 0.0051 -0.30 0.12 [0.29]
DE UK 0.95 0.0041 0.95 0.0044 -0.04 0.27 [0.18]
DE US 0.95 0.0041 0.97 0.0038 -0.11 -0.03 [0.21]
JP UK 0.88 0.0051 0.95 0.0044 -0.32 -1.05 [0.38]
JP US 0.88 0.0051 0.97 0.0038 -0.27 -0.63 [0.25]
UK US 0.95 0.0044 0.97 0.0038 -0.15 -0.04 [0.19]
This table reports the empirical vs. model implied slope coefficient for the calibration case: one
habit parametrization per country. The first two columns refer to the country pair. The next two columns
to the first two habit moments of country 1. The next two columns to the habit parameterization of
country 2. Finally, the last three columns compare the model implied value to the empirical observation.
the calibration computationally much more complex.
The deviations of the slope coefficient are obviously larger than in the separate calibra-
tion. Nevertheless, every country pair remains within two standard deviations. The results
from this table suggest that Americans have the highest habit level (0.97). They are closely
followed by the Europeans, Germans (0.95) and British (0.95) also display relatively high
habit levels. The two countries from the far east, Japan (0.88) and Australia (0.86), show
much lower habit levels.
Joint calibration — the same habit parameterization for everybody
In the final calibration exercise, we want to analyze the model’s performance in the most
stringent cross-country setup. Table III.8 displays the results, when we restrict the habit
parameterization to be the same across all countries. The closest fit is attained for an
average habit of E[h] = 0.96 and a habit volatility of σ[h] = 0.0024. The lack of flexibility
obviously results in much larger deviations of the model implied values to the actual data.
While the joint calibration fails to account for JP - UK and DE - UK, the fit is acceptable
for eight out of ten country pairs remaining within two standard deviations of the data.
III.6 Conclusion
This paper studies the co-movement between interest rates and exchange rates within a
Lucas (1982) style model with endogenous consumption decisions. The most crucial addi-
tional assumptions are habit formation, incomplete markets and country-specific goods.
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Table III.8: UIP slope coefficient — joint calibration
Ctry1 Ctry2 Model β Emp. β s.e.
AU DE -0.05 0.25 [0.21]
AU JP 0.30 0.10 [0.27]
AU UK -0.04 -0.19 [0.23]
AU US 0.07 -0.04 [0.17]
DE JP -0.20 0.12 [0.29]
DE UK -0.17 0.27 [0.18]
DE US 0.37 -0.03 [0.21]
JP UK -0.16 -1.05 [0.38]
JP US -0.18 -0.63 [0.25]
UK US 0.35 -0.04 [0.19]
This table shows the empirical vs. model implied slope coefficient for the calibration case: the same habit
parameterization for every country (E[h] = 0.96, σ[h] = 0.0024).
Theoretically, risk premia drive time-varying international hedging decisions, which
lead to a possible explanation for the forward premium anomaly.
Empirically, the model convinces twofold. Firstly, it matches the first two moments
for FX returns, inflation, income growth; and most notably the correlation between FX
returns and income growth. Secondly, it reproduces the slope coefficient in the regression
of FX returns on interest rate differentials for ten different country pairs.
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III.A Robustness in technical parameters
Table III.9: Technical parameters
Parameter (Quarterly) Value
Habit boundaries scale ζ 1
Habit grid size nh 3
Wealth boundaries w¯H = w¯F -0.1
Wealth grid size nw 11
In addition to our economic calibration, there are also a few technical parameters, which
we need to choose for the numerical procedure. These parameters are listed in Table III.9.
The parameter choice reflects a trade-off between computational effort and accuracy. The
idea of this section is to show that our main model result, the UIP slope coefficient, does
not dramatically change in any of these parameters.
Habit discretization
We discretize habit in the following fashion. Adding (subtracting) habit volatility times
the habit boundary scale factor ζ from average habit yields the upper (lower) bound for the
habit grid. Given the boundaries, we construct a linearly spaced grid with nh points. Since
it is convenient to have average habit as a gridpoint, we restrict the number of gridpoints
to an uneven number,
Figures III.5a and III.5b display the change in the slope coefficient when varying these
parameters. The number of grid points has almost no impact while the scaling factor has a
slight impact on the slope coefficient. Different discretization change the actual volatility
of habit resulting in different slope coefficients. Since habit volatility is calibrated to fit
the UIP slope, this lack of robustness is not a major issue. It only limits the comparability
of the absolute level of habit volatility across different numbers of habit nodes (nh).
Wealth discretization
Wealth is also discretized on an equally spaced grid. The boundaries are set to w¯. nw
determines the number of grid point. Figures III.5c and III.5d clearly show that both
parameters have no major impact on our model result.
III.B First order conditions
III.B.1 Normalization
To solve our model we first rewrite the nominal problem (eq. III.4) into the corresponding
real problem. For this purpose we set price level of nontradables to 1 and the price level
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of tradables as p1 respectively p2 for each country.
Let us denote R1,t =
1
1+πHt
and R2,t =
1
1+πFt
as the real returns of each bond. Fur-
thermore we redefine the shock vector and state space in real terms as follows: zt =
(R1,t, R2,t, y
H
t , y
F
t ) and Ψt = (wt, zt, ht). Then the dynamic programming problem trans-
forms into
Vt(Ψt) = max
ct,b1,t,b2,t
u(ct, ht) + δ Et[Vt+1(Ψt+1)],
subject to
cTG,t ≤ wt + yTG,t − q1,tb1,t − q2,tb2,t,
cNG,t ≤ yNG,t,
wt+1 = R1,t+1b1,t +R2,t+1b2,t,
b1,t ≥ b¯1
E[R1,t+1]
,
b2,t ≥ b¯2
E[R2,t+1]
,
w¯ ≤ b1,tq1,t + b2,tq2,t,
cTG,t ≥ hTG,t.
The last inequality is unnecessary in theory. The utility function is simply not defined for
values smaller than 0. However, it is necessary to enforce the condition for computational
reasons, as a solver might try to evaluate the function for cTG,t < hTG,t. Depending on the
choice of the risk aversion, this could either result in complex numbers or even lead to a
potential solution of the equation system, with no economic meaning.
To facilitate computation, we additionally normalize each agent’s problem with factors
κA and κB respectively. Given homothetic preferences the individual’s policies are simply
scaled by the normalization factor. Thus, the equilibrium remains unchanged under the
appropriate adjustment of market clearing conditions (see next section).
Define z˜t = (R1,t+1, R2,t+1, y˜
H
t , y˜
F
t ) and Ψ˜t = (w˜t, z˜t, h˜t) where κy˜t = yt, then
Vt(Ψ˜t) = max
c˜t,b˜1,t,b˜2,t
u(c˜t, h˜t) + δ Et[Vt+1(Ψ˜t+1)],
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subject to
c˜TG,t ≤ w˜t + y˜TG,t − q1,tb˜1,t − q2,tb˜2,t,
c˜NG,t ≤ y˜NG,t,
w˜t+1 = R1,t+1b˜1,t +R2,t+1b˜2,t,
b˜1,t ≥
˜¯b
E[R1,t+1]
,
b˜1,t ≥
˜¯b1
E[R1,t+1]
,
b˜2,t ≥
˜¯b2
E[R2,t+1]
,
˜¯w ≤ b˜1,tq1,t + b˜2,tq2,t,
c˜TG,t ≥ h˜TG,t
III.B.2 Kuhn-Tucker conditions
Concavity of the utility function allows us to impose equality for the first two conditions.
Inserting conditions two and three and denoting for simplicity u(ct, ht) = u(cTG,t) we can
write the Lagrangian as
L = u(c˜TG,t) + δ Et[Vt+1(Ψ˜t+1)] + µ (y˜TG,t + w˜t − q1,tb˜1,t − q2,tb˜2,t − c˜TG,t)
+ λ1 (b˜1,tEt[R1,t+1]− ˜¯b1)
+ λ2 (b˜2,tEt[R2,t+1]− ˜¯)b2
+ λ3 (b˜1,tq1,t + b˜2,tq2,t − ˜¯)w
+ λnn (c˜TG,t − h˜TG,t).
Deriving the Lagrangian with respect to each choice variable, adding the conditions
and restrictions on the Lagrange multipliers provides us with the following system of first
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order conditions:
∂L
∂c˜TG,t
= u′(c˜TG,t)− µ+ λnn != 0,
∂L
b˜1,t
= δEt
[
∂Vt+1
∂b˜1,t
]
− µq1,t + λ1E[R1,t+1] + λ3q1,t
= δ
∑
zt+1∈Γ(zt)
[
π(zt+1|zt) ∂u
∂c˜TG,t+1
∂c˜TG,t+1
∂w˜t+1
∂w˜t+1
∂b˜1,t
]
− µq1,t + λ1E[R1,t+1] + λ3q1,t
= δ
∑
zt+1∈Γ(zt)
[
π(zt+1|zt) ∂u
∂c˜TG,t+1
∂c˜TG,t+1
∂w˜t+1
R1,t+1
]
− µq1,t + λ1E[R1,t+1] + λ3q1,t != 0,
∂L
b˜2,t
= δEt
[
∂Vt+1
∂b˜2,t
]
− µq2,t + λ2 + λ3q2,t
= δ
∑
zt+1∈Γ(zt)
[
π(zt+1|zt) ∂u
∂c˜TG,t+1
∂c˜TG,t+1
∂w˜t+1
∂w˜t+1
∂b˜2,t
]
− µq2,t + λ2E[R2,t+1] + λ3q2,t
= δ
∑
zt+1∈Γ(zt)
[
π(zt+1|zt) ∂u
∂c˜TG,t+1
∂c˜TG,t+1
∂w˜t+1
R2,t+1
]
− µq2,t + λ2E[R2,t+1] + λ3q2,t != 0,
λ1(b˜1,tE[R1,t+1]− ˜¯b1) = 0,
λ2(b˜2,tEt[R2,t+1]− ˜¯b2) = 0,
λ3(b˜1,tq1,t + b˜2,tq2,t − w¯) = 0
λnn(c˜TG,t − (1− η)ht) = 0,
λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 ≥ 0, λ3 ≥ 0, λnn ≥ 0
where Γ(zt) denotes all states possibly following zt and π(zt+1|zt) are the transition prob-
abilities.
The same set of equations exists for the second agent and is completed by the market
clearing conditions
κAb˜A1,t + κ
B b˜B1,t = 0,
κAb˜A2,t + κ
B b˜B2,t = 0,
κAc˜ATG,t + κ
B c˜BTG,t = κ
Ay˜ATG,t + κ
B y˜BTG,t.
The market clearing conditions apply to the unnormalized economy. Thus, terms are
unnormalized with the agent specific normalization coefficient.
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III.B.3 Alternative conditions
It is computationally inconvenient to work with the inequality constraints for the Lagrange
multiplier. Therefore we use the following reformulation as described in Zangwill and
Garcia (1981).
The key is to replace the Lagrange multipliers by slacks, which are decomposed into a
positive and negative part
α+ = [ max(0, α) ]k,
α− = [ max(0,−α) ]k.
One would expect a k of 2 or 3 to work best to avoid any kinks in the nonlinear system of
equations. However, surprisingly, we find that k = 1 outperforms any other choice.
This allows us to rewrite the first order conditions into the following equivalent system
∂L
∂c˜TG,t
= u′(c˜TG,t)− µ+ α+nn+ != 0,
∂L
b˜1,t
= δ
∑
zt+1∈Γ(zt)
[
π(zt+1|zt) ∂u
∂c˜TG,t+1
R1,t+1
]
− µq1,t + α+1 Et[R1,t+1] + α+3 q1,t != 0,
∂L
b˜2,t
= δ
∑
zt+1∈Γ(zt)
[
π(zt+1|zt) ∂u
∂c˜TG,t+1
R2,t+1
]
− µq2,t + α+2 Et[R2,t+1] + α+3 q2,t != 0,
α−1 −(b˜1,tE[R1,t+1]− ˜¯b1) = 0,
α−2 −(b˜2,tEt[R2,t+1]− ˜¯b2) = 0,
α−3 −(b˜1,tq1,t + b˜2,tq2,t − w¯) = 0,
α−nn−(c˜TG,t − (1− η)ht) = 0,
α can be interpreted as the shadow price of the borrowing constraint. If the constraint
does not bind then α is negative and α− positive which equalizes the ≥ constraint. Thus,
essentially the borrowing constraint does not have a shadow price. If α is positive α+ is
positive showing up in the FOCs while the borrowing constraint exactly binds. The higher
α the more costly is the constraint.
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Figure III.5: UIP slope coefficient over various technical parameters
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(b) Habit grid size
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(c) Wealth boundary
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(d) Wealth grid size
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These figures report robustness checks in four technical parameters. We show how changes in these
parameters affect the slope coefficient in the base calibration.
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Part IV
Calibrating/Estimating Economic
Models Using Parallel Computing
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Calibrating/Estimating Economic Models
using Parallel Computing
Benjamin Jonen∗
In this writeup, I survey various techniques used to pin down parameters in macroeco-
nomic models. I look at parameter choice in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models
and focus on the way parallel computing can play an important role both in calibration
and estimation. Finally, I conclude with a specific application of parallel computing to
calibrate the model in Jonen and Scheuring (2012).
∗Department of Banking and Finance, University of Zurich, benjamin.jonen@bf.uzh.ch. I am grateful
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IV.1 Introduction
In this paper I provide an overview of calibration and estimation techniques used to pa-
rameterize macroeconomic models, particularly dynamic stochastic equilibrium (DSGE)
models.
Macroeconomic models become increasingly complex. Analytical solutions are rarely
available so that researchers have to rely on numerical solutions to analyze their mod-
els. Numerical dynamic programming is a common avenue to generate model solutions.
The algorithm recursively solves two-period problems until the policy (or value) functions
converge. Use of computational methods requires the discretization of the state space,
usually approximating the continuous state process with a discrete Markov chain, and the
approximation of the target functions.
Once a model solution is available, the next step is to assess the validity of the model.
The question of what makes a good model and how to assess its quality is controversially
discussed in the literature. I will provide a summary of the debate in the next section.
One common approach in the literature is to calibrate the model. First, a set of pa-
rameters is estimated from data or taken from existing studies. For example, preference
parameters can sometimes be taken from research in experimental economics. Second, the
parameters which cannot be easily observed have to be chosen in a meaningful way. This
step gives the researcher considerable degree of freedom which has to be used with caution.
Usually the parameters are chosen to match some model-implied moments.
Calibration is often criticized to lack a solid statistical foundation. Advocates of esti-
mation are looking for methods to apply econometric techniques to estimate model param-
eters and test the model’s validity. Various estimation techniques exist and are specifically
tailored towards the estimation of DSGE models.
By nature of numerical solutions, it is impossible to evaluate the model at all parameter
combinations. However, depending on the type of problem, the model has to be evaluated
at a large number of parameter combinations, either to pin down the free parameters,
maximize some likelihood or even to perform sensitivity analysis. Given today’s state of
computers, parallelization is the natural way to speed up the evaluation process. Par-
allelization can be done at different levels of the algorithm. I will argue that for many
macroeconomic models the parallelization should be done at the parameter level.
The paper concludes with a concrete example of how a global optimization routine that
dispatches jobs on a grid computer is used to calibrate the model proposed in Jonen and
Scheuring (2012).
IV.2 Calibration
Macroeconomic modeling has undergone large developments over the last decades. DeJong
and Dave (2011) summarize that system-of-equation models and in particular models of
behavioral equations “represented state-of-the-art practice in econometrics into the 1970s.”
These models, however, had one major shortcoming: In his influential paper Robert E. Lu-
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cas (1976) points out that model parameters describe the relation between macroeconomic
variables under certain policy regimes and are thus potentially sensitive to the studied
policy shifts. In his concluding remarks Robert E. Lucas (1976) notes that
“given that the structure of an econometric model consists of optimal decision
rules of economic agents, and that optimal decision rules vary systematically
with changes in the structure of series relevant to the decision maker, it follows
that any change in policy will systematically alter the structure of econometric
models. ”
As a reaction to this critique, macroeconomists have focused their attention on DSGE
models. In contrast to the above system-of-equation models, DSGE models have a microe-
conomic foundation: The basic structure involves the optimization of one or many decision
makers interacting on markets that are assumed to clear in equilibrium. The majority of
model parameters describe the preferences of individuals and the hope is that such param-
eters remain unchanged in policy regime shifts. This appealing class of models comes at a
cost however - models become increasingly hard to solve and assess empirically. Estima-
tion of DSGE models generally involve the reformulation of the model’s nonlinear system
of equation into a state-space representation. Then the derivation of the model’s likelihood
function, finally the application of maximum likelihood to arrive at parameter estimates.
When state-transition and measurement equations are linear (usually the result of a log-
linearization of a DSGE model) and innovations are normally distributed, the likelihood
can be derived analytically using the Kalman filter. Otherwise numerical methods have to
be used to evaluate the integrals that characterize the likelihood function (see DeJong and
Dave (2011) chapter 8).
Kydland and Prescott (1982) represents a turning point in the empirical assessment of
macroeconomic models. The authors renounce a formal econometric test or estimation of
the model and rather pick some parameters according to accounting data or micro studies1
while considering the remaining parameters as “free.” They evaluate the model on a grid
for the free parameter values and then choose the parameter values “that yielded what
[they] considered to be the best fit.” The resulting best fit is subjectively judged as “very
good, particularly in light of the model’s simplicity,” while no formal statistical test of the
model is conducted. Lucas (1987) argues that it is obvious the model is not ‘true’ and that
the best modelers can strive for “is a workable approximation that is useful in answering
a limited set of questions.”
The debate around calibration has been controversial. Many proponents of estimation
regard calibration, at best, as a first step in model assessment. Hansen and Sargent (1988)
write “the calculations described here are intended as a prolegomenon to pursuing esti-
mation, and as a way of indicating whether the model might match the data,” similarly
Manuelli and Sargent (1988) write “what reasons are there to expect the informal metric
implicitly used by Kydland-Prescott to yield better (in what sense?) estimators than esti-
mators derived from a formal metric [...].” According to Hansen and Heckman (1996) the
1A process Hoover (1995) refers to as “casual empiricism.”
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calibration methodology consists of two steps - calibration and verification which corre-
sponds to the standard econometric practice of estimation and testing. They conclude that
the calibration methodology is merely the use of a non-standard, “implicit” loss function.
“In looking at economic aggregates, [business cycle practicioners’] implicit loss function
appear to focus on the model predictions for long-run means, to the exclusion of other
features of the data, when selecting parameter estimates.” Hansen and Heckman further
criticize the casual use of microeconomic research as a basis for macroeconomic parameter
estimates: They argue that macroeconomists often use parameter estimates without taking
model-specification error as well as estimation error into account. If the estimates have
been obtained under the assumption of a different economic environment (model), they
might need some form of adjustment to serve as macroeconomic inputs. Standard errors
for parameter inputs are rarely reported and many papers provide insufficient sensitivity
analyses.
In the mid 90s Kydland and Prescott (1996) conclude that computational experiments
(model calibration) “have become invaluable tools for quantitative aggregate theory”, and
give a five step approach to execute a computational experiment. Step one and two are to
pose a question and to find a “well-tested theory” that suits this question. Step three is
the actual construction of the model to be computed. The fourth, is the controversial step
of model calibration. In this step “data are used to calibrate the model economy so that
it mimics the world as closely as possible along a limited, but clearly specified, number of
dimensions.” Once calibrated the model is then able to provide insights about outcomes
under different policy regimes. The final step is to run the computational experiment
and compare the simulated to the real world data. Hoover (1995), on the other hand,
remains doubtful. He writes that “above all, it is not clear on what standards compet-
ing, but contradictory models are to be compared and adjudicated [within the calibration
framework].”
While calibration remains an important tool in macroeconomics today, especially to
get a first impression of the model’s quality, several estimation techniques have matured
and endow researchers with a number of techniques to estimate DSGE models. I will
summarize several of these techniques in the next section. The discussion is primarily
based on DeJong and Dave (2011).
IV.3 Estimation
In this section I briefly review the main estimation techniques for DSGE models, broadly
categorizing them into likelihood based and moment based estimation.
IV.3.1 Likelihood based methods
The first step in likelihood based estimation is to rewrite the nonlinear equations of a DSGE
model into a state-space representation. I lay out the reformulation following DeJong and
Dave (2011) chapter 8.3. Let yt be a vector of observable variables, where Ψt ≡ {yj}tj=1.
77
Also let st be a vector of unobserved state variables with st ≡ {sj}tj=1. The state-space
representation can be characterized by the state-transition density
f(st|st−1,Ψt−1),
the observation density
f(yt|st,Ψt−1),
and the initial distribution of the state
f(s0) ≡ f(s0|Ψ0).
After the DSGE model has been cast into this representation, the time-t likelihood function
can be computed from
f(yt|Ψt−1) =
∫
f(yt|st,Ψt−1)f(st|Ψt−1)dst, (IV.1)
where the so called predictive density can be obtained from the state-transition density by
marginalizing over st−1
f(st|Ψt−1) =
∫
f(st|st−1,Ψt−1)f(st−1|Ψt−1)dst−1 . (IV.2)
and the so called filtering density is given by
f(st|Ψt) = f(yt|st,Ψt−1)f(st|Ψt−1)
f(yt|Ψt−1) . (IV.3)
Given the dependencies in equations (IV.1), (IV.2) and (IV.3), the computation of the
time-t likelihood function has to be performed sequentially, starting from the filtering
density for t = 1
f(s1|Ψ0) =
∫
f(s1|s0,Ψ0)f(s0)ds0 .
In general the integral in eq. (IV.1) is hard to solve analytically. In chapter 9 of their
book DeJong and Dave (2011) discuss Monte Carlo integration techniques to assess the
value of this integral numerically. The overall log-likelihood function associated with a
parameter vector µ is given by
logL(ΨT |µ) =
T∑
t=1
f(yt|Ψt−1).
Amemiya (1985) shows that under regularity conditions the maximum likelihood estimator
is consistent and asymptotically normal. This is the classical way to estimate and conduct
inference for DSGE models.
An alternative to maximum likelihood estimation are Bayesian methods. Bayesian
methods appear well-suited for DSGE estimation because researchers usually have some
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prior on the relevant parameter range of their structural, as opposed to reduced form,
models. Ruge-Murcia (2007) writes “economic theory, previous macroeconomic studies
and long-run averages of aggregate data can be informative about the parameter values
in structural macroeconomic models.” In calibration, this prior is used to pin down the
majority of parameters directly, while under Bayesian estimation the researcher states a
prior distribution of the parameters. While maximum likelihood relies on the maximization
of a highly dimensional complicated function, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde (2010) points out that
Bayesian analysis relies on integrating that function, which is arguably easier.
IV.3.2 Moment based estimation
Similar to the calibration methodology, moment based estimation focuses on key aspects
(moments) of the data instead of targeting an overall fit. Hoover (1995) notes that “cal-
ibrators of real-business-cycle models typically concentrate on matching selected second
moments of variables rather than, say, matching the actual historical evolution of the
modeled variables” because the focus is on the model’s ability to fit one time series but
to characterize the “distribution from which that realization was drawn.” In contrast to
the calibration methodology, however, moment based estimation is a formal econometric
technique that allows for estimation and formal statistical testing.
In cases when the target moments can be evaluated analytically the generalized method
of moments (GMM) described in Hansen and Singleton (1982) can be applied. This is
generally not the case for DSGE models. I will thus focus my attention on the so called
method of simulated moments (SMM) which applies the ideas of GMM to simulated data.
SMM was first developed in the context of discrete choice (see McFadden (1989) and
Pakes and Pollard (1989)) and later extended to time series models (see Lee and Ingram
(1991) and Duffie and Singleton (1993)). The key problem to apply the method of moments
to the simulated time series data of DSGE models is that the data itself depends on the
parameter choice. That is, while the standard Hansen GMM objective depends on the
parameters directly, model simulated data depends on the parameters also through the
time series itself. Duffie and Singleton derive conditions under which the SMM estimator
can be used. Additionally they prove consistency and characterize estimator’s distribution.
In the following, I define the SMM estimator and its distribution closely following Duffie
and Singleton (1993) and Ruge-Murcia (2007).
We are confronted with real world data yt of T data points. Additionally, for any given
parameter vector µ, simulate the model economy and obtain the time series yµt with τT
data points, where the introduction of τ allows us to simulate a longer time series than the
actually observed series. Given this data we choose an observation function f that describes
the moments of the data we are interested in. The function f ∗t = f(yt, yt−1, ..., yt−l+1) con-
siders the past l (l < T ) observations and generates actual data moments. The counterpart
fµt = f(y
µ
t , y
µ
t−1, ..., y
µ
t−l+1) describes the moments for the simulated data at parameter µ.
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For given µ, the difference in sample moments is defined in Duffie and Singleton (1993) as
GT (µ) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
f ∗t −
1
τT
τT∑
s=1
fµs
The SMM estimator is the value of µ that minimizes the quadratic form
µSMM = argmin
µ
GT (µ)
′WGT (µ), (IV.4)
where W is the optimal weighting matrix
W = lim
T→∞
V ar((1/
√
T )
T∑
t=1
fµt ).
Under the regularity conditions in Duffie and Singleton (1993) (section 5), the authors
show that the SMM estimator is asymptotically normal
√
T (µSMM − µ)→ N(0, (1 + 1/τ)(D′W−1D),
where D = E(∂fµt /∂µ). For given µ, D can be approximated as
D(µ) =
∂[ 1
τT
∑τT
t=1 f
µ
t ]
∂µ
.
IV.4 Empirical example
In this section, I describe the calibration strategy in Jonen and Scheuring (2012). The
strategy is close to the method of simulated moments, but with a target function that
punishes deviations more strongly. As we move away from SMM, we give up the ability
to formally test our model and its parameters. Instead we focus on finding parameters
for which the deviation between model predictions and data is below a certain cutoff
across different countries simultaneously. I now proceed to give a detailed summary of the
calibration strategy employed in the paper, relating it to the discussion in the previous
sections.
We develop a two-country model that allows us to replicate the empirical observation
that interest rate differentials have no or reverse predictability of exchange rate returns.
The model is calibrated using data estimates, some self-computed, some taken from the
literature, leaving open only the parametrization of the habit process
ht+1 = ρht + ηct. (IV.5)
To make the calibration procedure more intuitive, we choose the first two moments of the
process, E[h] and V[h]. The parameters ρ and η can be backed out using
ρ =
E[h]2
E[c]2
V[c]− V[h]
E[h]2
E[c]2
V[c] + V[h]
, (IV.6)
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η = (1− ρ)E[h]
E[c]
,
where E refers to the unconditional expectation and V to the unconditional variance.
Our goal is to find a parametrization for the habit process that resolves the forward
premium puzzle for five different countries. Given our two-country model economy that
means we analyze ten different country pairs. To make a convincing cross-country calibra-
tion, each country maintains the same habit parametrization independent of the country
it interacts with. Our general calibration strategy is to find parameters to minimize the
distance between model prediction and data. Two parameters for each country determine
preferences in the model. Thus we face a ten-dimensional optimization problem. One pos-
sible objective would be to minimize the squared deviation between model predicted and
empirical slope coefficient. This objective is similar to the SMM objective in eq. (IV.4),
whereW = I and the moments 1
S
∑S
s=1 ft are replaced with
Cov(∆st+1,it−i∗t )
V (∆st+1
, the slope coeffi-
cient of a forward premium regression. Instead of simply minimizing the distance in slopes,
we look at the distance in slopes scaled by the standard error of the empirical regression
coefficient
|βTh − βEmp|
SEEmp
,
where βTh and βEmp represent the slope coefficients obtained from forward premium re-
gressions of the simulated and actual data respectively and SEEmp represents the standard
error of the slope coefficient of the regression on actual data. In the optimization procedure
we additionally weight each country-pair’s deviation to arrive at a parametrization that
fits all country pairs relatively well. The penalty function is plotted in Figure IV.1. De-
viations up to one standard error are weighted linearly, while deviations between one and
two standard errors are weighted quadratically. Deviations beyond two standard errors are
weighted with power four.
We use a global optimization routine to solve this ten-dimensional non-convex problem.
In particular we use a differential evolution algorithm described in Storn and Price (1997).
Figure IV.2 summarizes the general idea in the following simplified way: Draw an initial
population and evaluate the population with the objective function. In the next step
the algorithm generates a new population according to some “evolution” rule. After the
new population is evaluated, the superior population members survive. If the surviving
population fulfills the convergence criterion, the optimization is terminated with success
otherwise the process starts over again.
The complexity of the problem requires a large number of model solutions. But since
model evaluations at different parameter combinations are independent of each other, we
have the possibility to execute them in parallel. In contrast to gradient based solvers
for example, the critical feature of the differential evolution algorithm is that evaluations
within one iteration are independent of each other. This is depicted in the second panel of
Figure IV.2. Instead of evaluating one population member after the other we can evaluate
all of them in parallel on a grid computer. Of course the next step in which populations
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Figure IV.1: Penalty function for each country-pair deviation
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This figure displays the penalty function employed in the optimization procedure. We impose small
punishment on deviations smaller one, larger punishment up to a deviation of two and quickly growing
punishment for larger deviations.
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compete is delayed until all evaluations have completed. In our case this is hardly a
constraint as model evaluation times are quite homogeneous.
To make use of these observations, we integrated the differential evolution implementa-
tion from Chakraborty (2008) into the grid computing software gc3pie2, a software, quoting
from its web site, that “aids in submitting and controlling batch jobs to clusters and grid
resources seamlessly.” With this implementation of the global optimization routine, we are
able to perform the evaluation steps in parallel submitting jobs to the Swiss-wide cluster
network available through the Grid Computing Competence Center at the University of
Zurich.
Figure IV.3 displays the populations development over algorithm iterations. Panel
IV.3a shows the initial random sample of 100 parameter combinations. Parameters are
drawn within the following constraints. First we impose upper and lower bounds on the
parameters. Average habit is constrained to lie in the range 0.8 to 1.0, while habit volatility
is constrained to lie between 0.000 and 0.010. Additionally we impose
σH ≤ µH
µY
σY ,
making sure that tomorrow’s habit is a positive function of today’s consumption. These
constraints are country-dependent, and are depicted in Figure IV.3 with the respective
country’s color. Note that each parameter combination lies below the respective country’s
habit volatility constraint and within the box constraints. The figure shows how the
population evolves over time. After 40 iterations the parameter combinations already
start to cluster. The process continues for the next 120 iterations. After 240 iterations the
population of parameter combinations yields a clear indication of the model implied habit
parameters for all countries except Australia. UK has the lowest habit volatility. Average
habit is higher in the US than in Germany and higher in Germany than in Japan. Because
of this distinct clustering and the optimizer’s inability to improve the best target value,
the population is likely to remain unchanged and we terminate the optimization.
The general structure of this application is very similar to the estimation techniques
described in the previous sections. While we do not perform formal statistical testing we
move away from picking (potentially by hand) some parameter combination that fits the
data well and instead explicitly employ a target (loss) function.
Other techniques, for example the method of simulated moments, may easily be cast in
the computational framework that we constructed. Similar to this application the SMM ob-
jective function is usually non-convex and requires the use of a global optimization routine.
With the help of current grid computing, these problems can be solved in reasonable time
allowing the researcher to estimate structural model parameters and importantly report
measures of certainty about these values.
Parallelization could of course also be done at the model evaluation level. For example,
at each time iteration the model usually has to be solved at a large number of states. The
problem with this approach is that the results have to be aggregated much more often. This
2The open source software can be obtained from http://code.google.com/p/gc3pie/.
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Figure IV.2: Differential evolution algorithm
(a) Differential Evolution Algorithm
Guess Initial Population
Evaluate Objective Function 
Recreate Population as
linear combinations
New Population
Battle. 
New better?Keep old
ReplaceConverged?
yes
yes
no
no
(b) Parallel Differential Evolution Algorithm
Guess Initial Population
Evaluate Objective Function 
Recreate Population as
linear combinations
New Population
Battle. 
New better?Keep old
ReplaceConverged?
yes
yes
no
no
Evaluate Objective Function Evaluate Objective Function 
The top panel displays the differential evolution algorithm. The figure is based on Figure 1, page 3 in
Chakraborty (2008). The bottom panel depicts how we parallelize the algorithm.
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Figure IV.3: Evolution of parameter combinations
(a) Initial population (b) Population after 40 iterations
(c) Population after 120 iterations (d) Population after 240 iterations
The subfigures track the evolution of parameter guesses of the global optimization routine through it-
erations. Each point represents one parameter combination investigated. Countries are represented by
different colors. Straight lines indicate constraints that the solver fulfills. Panel (a) depicts the initial
population. Panel (b), (c), (d) show the population after 40, 120 and 240 iterations. The target value of
the current best guess is reported above each subplot.
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usually requires that all jobs run on one grid computer with shared memory which is much
more expensive than a loose grid. Thus, the fact that the model needs to be evaluated at
various parameter combinations can be exploited to reduce computation costs by placing
the parallelization at this “highest” level in the analysis.
IV.5 Conclusion
This writeup provides an overview of different avenues to pick parameters in complex
economic models. I summarize the calibration methodology and the controversial debate
that followed its first use. Further I explore state-of-the art estimation techniques including
likelihood and moment based techniques to estimate model parameters. Finally, I use
a specific example of a complex model and show how today’s computer technology in
connection with the ideas outlined in the beginning can be exploited to pin down model
parameters.
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Asset Pricing with Idiosyncratic Risk:
The Impact of Job Loss
Benjamin Jonen, Simon Scheuring∗
Abstract
This paper studies the impact of unemployment risk on risk premia in an incom-
plete markets economy with many infinitely-lived heterogeneous agents. Job loss is
modeled as large, but rare, persistent idiosyncratic shocks with heteroskedastic coun-
tercyclical volatility. Within an otherwise standard model and despite conservative
assumptions on preferences, we simultaneously generate a sizeable equity premium
and a low risk-free rate.
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V.1 Introduction
Mehra and Prescott (1985) show that the representative-agent complete markets model
cannot replicate essential empirical facts in finance. An important strand of the literature
has identified idiosyncratic risk as a potential explanation for the observed asset prices1.
However, attempts to model idiosyncratic risk, generally involve modeling heterogeneous
agents with incomplete markets. Since it is usually necessary to track one state variable per
agent, such models quickly become intractable. One approach in the literature has been
to reduce the state space by assuming the endogenous policy functions to be independent
of each other.2 This obviously remediates the problem of intractability, however, arguably
also avoids the multidimensional nature of the problem.
In this paper we follow a different strand of literature3 and employ the approximation
algorithm of Smolyak (1963). It breaks the curse of dimensionality by picking interpolation
points in a clever way. As a result, computing time grows only polynomially rather than
exponentially as the number of state variables increases. This allows us to analyze more
involved models of idiosyncratic risk with up to six agents without simplifying assumptions
on policies. In particular, we are able to model job loss. By definition, idiosyncratic risk
has to cancel out on the aggregate level. Thus, the loss of one agent must be the gain
of the others. If one attempts to model unemployment in a two-agent economy then the
employment income will be unrealistically large, which has severe implications on asset
prices. Extending the analysis to a larger number of agents mitigates this problem and
makes an analysis of a skewed income distribution feasible.
Within a Lucas (1978) framework we incorporate several model extensions suggested
in the literature of idiosyncratic risk. Mankiw (1986) finds that the more concentrated
shocks are on a small part of the population, the higher the risk premium. This is the case
for job loss, which we model as large, but rare, idiosyncratic shocks. Among many others,
Lucas (1994) and Heaton and Lucas (1996) stress the importance of market frictions.
We assume that markets are dynamically incomplete: No asset allows direct insurance
of income shocks and when unemployed, agents face a tight borrowing constraint. The
constraint prevents them from smoothing consumption through borrowing in bad times and
repaying in good times. Constantinides and Duffie (1996) rely on persistent idiosyncratic
shocks with heteroskedastic countercyclical volatility. Empirically, unemployment is a
lagged indicator of economic growth. Our model takes this co-movement into account by
assuming that unemployment risk is high in recessions and low in booms and that agents
remain unemployed until the economy picks up again.
The novel combination of these features generates realistic risk premia, despite low
aggregate income growth volatility and conservative assumptions on preferences. A realistic
calibration for the United States results in an equity premium of 4.7% with a risk-free rate
1See among many others Bewley (1982), Mankiw (1986), Weil (1992), Telmer (1993), Lucas (1994),
Heaton and Lucas (1996) or Constantinides and Duffie (1996).
2See Aiyagari (1994), Krusell and Smith (1997), Krusell and Smith (1998), Storesletten, Telmer, and
Yaron (2007).
3Krueger and Kubler (2004), Krueger and Kubler (2006) and Malin, Krueger, and Kubler (2011).
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of 1.4%. Thus, the model generates large risk premia despite low risk-free rates.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 specifies
the unemployment dynamics. The calibration is found in section 4, followed by the results
in section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes.
V.2 The model
V.2.1 Economy
We consider an endowment economy, populated by n infinitely-lived agents. We denote
average income per agent as Yt and assume aggregate income (nYt) to grow with a stochastic
rate gt+1 =
Yt+1
Yt
.
V.2.2 Preferences
Each agent has the same recursive Epstein and Zin (1989) preferences over consumption
Ct
Vt(Wt, zt) =
[
(Ct − ςYt)1−ρ + βEt
[
Vt+1(Wt+1, zt+1)
1−γ
] 1−ρ
1−γ
] 1
1−ρ
, (V.1)
where ψ = 1
ρ
is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES), γ the risk aversion, β
the subjective time discount factor and ς the relative subsistence level of consumption as
a fraction of average income (Yt). The subsistence level captures the idea that households
need a minimum level of consumption to survive. More concretely, we think of the subsis-
tence level as the level of consumption necessary to provide a household with basic needs
as discussed in Sharif (1986). Utility is then derived only from consumption which exceeds
the basic needs of survival. The state of the economy can be summarized by the wealth
vector Wt = (W
1
t ,W
2
t , . . . ,W
n
t ) and the current shock zt. The current shock describes the
aggregate state of the economy as well as the individual level of income.
V.2.3 Assets
One firm produces the entire output nYt of the economy. The firm liquidates everything
at the beginning of each period and splits the output into payoffs to employees (Yl,t), bond
holders (Pb,t) and stock holders (Ps,t)
Yt = Yl,t + Pb,tb¯+ Ps,ts¯,
where b¯ and s¯ denote the supply of bonds and stocks.
Typically, the claims of bond holders and employees are senior to the claims of stock
holders. Abstracting from the possibility of default, we follow an extension in Mehra and
Prescott (1985) and define stock payoffs as the stochastic part of the economy
Ps,ts¯ = Yt − (1− s¯)Et−1[Yt].
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Then aggregate wages and payouts to bond holders are fractions of the anticipated output
of the economy
Pb,t = Et−1[Yt],
Yl,t = l¯Et−1[Yt],
where l¯ is the share of wages as part of the expected aggregate firm output.
To acquire claims on output next period, people can invest in the firm at the end of
each period by buying bonds (bit) or investing in stocks (s
i
t). In total all claims need to
equal the amount available to distribute
n∑
i=1
bit = b¯,
n∑
i=1
sit = s¯.
V.2.4 Idiosyncratic risk
Similar to Lucas (1994), we introduce idiosyncratic shocks to agents’ income Ψit. Then,
agents’ labour income can be decomposed into the non-stochastic part (Yl,t) and an id-
iosyncratic shock: Y il,t = Yl,t + Ψ
i
t. To match aggregate income, the idiosyncratic shocks
need to sum up to zero
∑n
i=1Ψ
i
t = 0.
Then, the budget constraint is
W it + Y
i
l,t = Qs,ts
i
t +Qb,tb
i
t + C
i
t (V.2)
and wealth accumulates according to
W it+1 = Ps,t+1s
i
t + Pb,t+1b
i
t. (V.3)
Furthermore, we assume that agents face state-contingent borrowing constraints. End
of period net wealth of agent i (investment) has to lie above some minimum fraction of
average income iit < 0
Qs,ts
i
t +Qb,tb
i
t ≥ iitY¯t.
V.3 Unemployment dynamics
The previous section described the general framework. In this section, we specify the struc-
ture of idiosyncratic shocks. While they are part of the model assumptions, we devote an
entire section to unemployment dynamics for two reasons: First, to reflect the importance
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Table V.1: Aggregate Markov chain
(a) Shocks
State gt
1 µg − σg
2 µg + σg
(b) Transition
State 1 2
1 p 1− p
2 1− p p
idiosyncratic shocks play for the emerging model predictions. Second, to freely discuss
computational considerations and impacts on calibration choices.
To make models numerically tractable, it is necessary to discretize the aggregate and
individual shock space. The usual approach is to write the model in continuous states and
then apply a discretization method, such as Tauchen and Hussey (1991). However, in this
paper, we choose to model the dynamics of exogenous processes directly in a discrete shock
space.
This leads to the usual trade-off between computational feasibility (a small number of
states) and a realistic setting (a large number of states). The idea behind our Markov
chain is to minimize the number of states, while maintaining the necessary components to
model aggregate and idiosyncratic risk.
V.3.1 Markov chain
Similar to Mankiw (1986), our Markov chain is composed of two parts: Aggregate shocks
indicate the distribution of average income over time. Idiosyncratic shocks specify the
distribution of income across agents.
Aggregate Markov chain
Table V.1 shows the discretization of the aggregate economy’s growth rate (gt) into a
Markov chain with two states. Economic growth is high in one state and low in the
other. To match the first two unconditional moments, we construct the shock matrix
by subtracting and adding the observed standard deviation to the observed mean. The
corresponding transition matrix is parameterized by p, denoting the probability to remain
in the same growth state. Empirically, income growth persistence is small (see Table V.5).
Thus, for simplicity, we assume i.i.d income growth, i.e. p = 0.5.
Individual Markov chain
We model job loss through a separate Markov chain displayed in Table V.2. The shock
matrix specifies idiosyncratic shocks and consists of n rows, where each row i represents
the state in which agent i falls unemployed. Each agent’s shock to income is represented
by one column in the matrix. The entries display the percent deviation of agent i’s labor
income from average income, denoted ψit =
Ψit
Yl,t
. Agent i suffers from job loss in state i and
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Table V.2: Individual Markov chain
State ψ1t ψ
2
t ψ
3
t . . . ψ
n
t
1 −∆ ∆
n−1
∆
n−1 . . .
∆
n−1
2 ∆
n−1 −∆ ∆n−1 . . . ∆n−1
3 ∆
n−1
∆
n−1 −∆ . . . ∆n−1
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
n ∆
n−1
∆
n−1
∆
n−1 . . . −∆
thus receives a lower income. Agent j receives a small positive income adjustment in state
i to cancel out agent i’s shock at the aggregate. For example, in state 1 agent 1 receives
an income shock of ψ1t = −∆. Thus agent 1’s labor income amounts to Y 1l,t = (1−∆)Yl,t.
Similarly agent 2’s income in state 1 is increased by ∆
n−1
resulting in a labor income of
Y 2l,t =
(
1 + ∆
n−1
)
Yl,t.
Common Markov chain
Finally, Table V.3 combines the individual and the aggregate into a common Markov chain.
First, unemployment only occurs in an economic downturn. Second, once unemployed, an
agent remains unemployed with probability p and regains employment when the economy
recovers with probability 1 − p. Since job loss only occurs in an economic downturn,
idiosyncratic risk is countercyclical and heteroskedastic.
This construction has two advantages: Economically, it incorporates countercyclical
heteroscedastic idiosyncratic shocks. Computationally, the number of states is the number
of agents plus one, thus as small as possible.
V.3.2 Intuition
The next two sections show that with the above structure of unemployment dynamics, the
model is capable of simultaneously generating large risk premia and low risk-free rates with
modest and conservative calibration choices. In this subsection we attempt to provide an
intuition for this result.
Unemployment constitutes a large, potentially long lasting, hit on agents’ income. From
a partial equilibrium perspective, agents generally have three ways to smooth consumption
as a response to idiosyncratic shocks. First, agents can buy direct ex-ante insurance.
Second, agents can save as a precaution. Third, agents can indebt themselves, whenever
income is low and pay it back later.
In our model, agents cannot buy ex-ante insurance against future job losses, since
markets are dynamically incomplete. Indebting is limited through the borrowing con-
straint. Therefore, agents have to rely mainly on precautionary savings to smooth their
consumption. Figure V.1 illustrates the development of wealth over the unemployment
cycle. Initially, the agent will build up wealth as a precaution for a potential future job
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Table V.3: Common Markov chain
(a) Shocks
State gt ψ
1
t ψ
2
t ψ
3
t . . . ψ
n
t
1 µg − σg −∆ ∆n−1 ∆n−1 . . . ∆n−1
2 µg − σg ∆n−1 −∆ ∆n−1 . . . ∆n−1
3 µg − σg ∆n−1 ∆n−1 −∆ . . . ∆n−1
...
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
n µg − σg ∆n−1 ∆n−1 ∆n−1 . . . −∆
n+1 µg + σg 0 0 0 . . . 0
(b) Transition
State 1 2 3 . . . n n+ 1
1 p 0 0 . . . 0 1− p
2 0 p 0 . . . 0 1− p
3 0 0 p . . . 0 1− p
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
n 0 0 0 . . . p 1− p
n+ 1 1−p
n
1−p
n
1−p
n
. . . 1−p
n
p
Figure V.1: Illustration of wealth dynamics
employed unemployed employed
time
wealth
borrowing
constraint
precautionary
saving
precautionary
saving
excess
spending
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loss. Upon job loss, the agent enters a phase of excess spending, consuming the accumu-
lated wealth. After all savings are depleted, agents start borrowing. Eventually, however,
the borrowing constraint will hit. From this point on, consumption is limited to income.
When the economy picks up again and the agent regains employment, the cycle starts over
from the beginning with precautionary saving.
All in all, precautionary savings is the primary way for agents to smooth idiosyncratic
income shocks. High asset demand raises prices and reduces returns, allowing us to generate
large risk-premia while maintaining a realistically low risk-free rate.
V.4 Calibration
This section discusses the model calibration. Table V.4 summarizes discretionary choices,
while the top panel of Table V.5 shows estimated input data.
V.4.1 Population size
The economy is populated by six agents (n = 6). According to the specification of the
unemployment dynamics six agents imply an average unemployment rate of 8.3%. As a
comparison, the US post war average is 5.8%. Figure V.2 displays the historical evolution.
One can see large fluctuations over time, ranging from below 3% to almost 10%. The
empirical annual volatility is 1.6%. Our model implied annual volatility is somewhat larger
with 4.2%.
V.4.2 Preferences
We distinguish two calibration choices in the second panel of Table V.4. The third column
specifies the parameterization under constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) (ψ = 1
γ
). We
set risk aversion (γ) to 5. We adapt the discount factor (β) to arrive at reasonable values
for the risk-free rate. In particular we set β = 0.97.
Since the risk premium under this specification is still relatively small, we investigate
the effect of increasing γ (reducing ψ). Increasing risk aversion reduces ψ in the CRRA
framework. Empirically ψ is estimated to be “significantly different from zero, and proba-
bly close to 1”4. Thus, as we increase risk aversion it seems plausible to move away from
the standard CRRA preferences and adjust ψ. The fourth column describes the parame-
terization under the general Epstein-Zin preferences where we set risk aversion to 8 and the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution to 0.33. Again, to arrive at a reasonable risk-free
rate we adjust the discount factor, in this case 0.99.
We set the subsistence level (ς) in both parameterizations to 10%. Thus, we assume
that the US median-income household of $49, 4005 cannot survive with less than $5, 000.
4Beaudry and Wincoop (1996). Hansen and Singleton (1982) and Campbell and Cochrane (1999) also
find the IES to be larger than 1
γ
.
5DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and Smith (2011).
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Figure V.2: Unemployment rate
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Seasonally adjusted unemployment rate over time, 16 years and older, annual averages, provided by the
U.S. Department of Labor.
Table V.4: Parameters
Parameter CRRA EZ
Number of agents n 6 6
Discount factor β 0.97 0.99
Risk aversion γ 5 8
IES ψ 0.20 0.33
Subsistence level ς 10% 10%
Bond supply b¯ 20% 20%
Stock supply s¯ 15% 15%
Borrowing constraint, when unem. i −5% −5%
Replacement rate 1−∆ 45% 45%
This table displays two calibration choices. The left column represents preferences with constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA), γ = 1/ψ. The right column represents Epstein-Zin (EZ) preferences, γ 6= 1/ψ.
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Table V.5: Moments — base calibration
Parameter Data CRRA EZ
Avg. income growth µg 3.3% 3.3% 3.3%
Income growth volatility σg 2.8% 2.8% 2.8%
Income growth AC AC[g] −0.1% 0% 0%
Avg. consumption growth µg 3.4% 3.3% 3.3%
Consumption growth vola. σg 2.0% 2.8% 2.8%
Consumption growth AC AC[g] 9.9% 0% 0%
Idiosyncratic income vola σ
[
Y it+1/Y
i
t
]
25.1% 40.0% 40.0%
Idiosyncratic cons. vola σ
[
Cit+1/C
i
t
]
6%− 12% 14.4% 15.2%
Avg. market return E[Rm] 8.7% 5.1% 6.1%
Market return vola. σ[Rm] 17.1% 18.9% 19.1%
Avg. risk-free rate E[Rf ] 1.4% 1.6% 1.4%
Risk-free rate vola. σ[Rf ] 2.5% 2.4% 1.7%
Risk premium E[Rm −Rf ] 7.3% 3.5% 4.7%
This table compares model implied moments with empirical observations. The two calibrations
for CRRA and EZ preferences are displayed in the two rightmost columns. The data sources are as
follows:
Income growth: BEA, Real Gross Domestic Product, seasonally adjusted, 1947-2010.
Consumption growth: OECD, private final consumption expenditure, 1947-2010.
Idiosyncratic income volatility: From Heaton and Lucas (1996).
Idiosyncratic consumption volatility: From Brav, Constantinides, and Geczy (2002).
Market return: Value weighted NYSE, including dividends, 1947-2010, deflated by CPI from CRSP.
Risk-free rate: T-Bills 90 days, deflated by CPI from CRSP.
V.4.3 Financial economy
The third panel of Table V.4 displays the parameterization of the financial economy. The
firm in our economy distributes its production through labor, bond and stocks. We assume
these shares to be 65% for labor (l¯), 20% for bonds (b¯) and 15% for stocks (s¯). We
also enforce a borrowing constraint, denoted i, in the unemployment state only. This
is computationally easier and does not matter economically since agents in employment
have no reason to borrow. In the real world unemployed agents have hard time borrowing
beyond negative net wealth. In this situation credit cards tend to be one of the few ways
to borrow but without a proper proof of employment limits tend to be tight. Heaton and
Lucas (1996) argue a value between 0% and −10% is reasonable. We pick the middle and
choose the boundary on net wealth of the unemployed (i) as −5%.
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Figure V.3: Unemployment
(a) Replacement rate
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(b) Average benefit collection time
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Replacement rate: “Average Weekly UI [unemployment insurance] Benefit as a Percent of Average Weekly
Wage”, US Department of Labor.
Average benefit collection time: “The average number of weeks for which unemployment insurance
claimants collect benefits under regular state programs”, US Department of Labor.
V.4.4 Real economy
Aggregate growth
The first two panels of Table V.5 depict aggregate income and consumption growth. Income
growth refers to the real gross domestic product, seasonally adjusted from the U.S. Bureau
of Economic Analysis over the horizon 1947 - 2010. Consumption is private final consump-
tion expenditure, also seasonally adjusted over the same time horizon, obtained from the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Due to the lack of
a savings technology, aggregate income is identical to aggregate consumption. Matching
income growth as opposed to consumption growth is an arbitrary choice.
Unemployment
Calibrating unemployment requires choosing two parameters: first, the replacement rate
(1−∆), how much income unemployed agents receive relative to how much they received
in employment; second, the duration of unemployment, the average time it takes agents to
regain employment.
Figure V.3a shows the replacement rate time series for the United States from 1988 to
2010. In 1988 the replacement rate was about 44% increasing to about 47% in the last
decade. In a longer perspective, government transfers have increased over time. Therefore,
historically the replacement rate has certainly been much lower. We take the conservative
value of 45% as the replacement rate (1−∆). Thus, falling unemployed implies an income
drop of 55%.
Autocorrelation in US aggregate income growth is very small (see Table V.5). Thus, we
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model income growth as a random walk. As the model is computed in quarterly frequency,
this implies, by construction of the Markov chain, an expected unemployment time of 6
months6. It is unclear which empirical proxy for average unemployment time to look at.
One possibility is to look at average benefit collection time, see Figure V.3b. Historically,
it has been between 13 and 20 weeks. However, as many people in unemployment remain
unemployed past the stage of entitlement to benefits, the average duration of unemployment
is certain to be higher. Thus, we believe, the implied value of 6 months, e.g. about 25
weeks is reasonable.
V.5 Results
In this section we first discuss the results under the main calibration. Next we discuss how
the model results are affected by changes in the calibration and attempt to demonstrate
the underlying mechanisms. For this purpose, we present three scenarios. First, we analyze
the implications of Epstein-Zin preferences by varying risk aversion and IES. Second, we
display comparative statics by presenting changes in a single input parameter. Third, we
look at the impact of job loss by considering the alternative scenario of no idiosyncratic
risk.
V.5.1 Base calibration
Table V.5 displays empirical moments obtained from simulating the model under the two
base calibrations for CRRA and EZ discussed in the previous chapter. The second panel
displays aggregate consumption. As we do not model a production side, aggregate con-
sumption is identical to aggregate income. Therefore, while income is matched, consump-
tion moments obviously deviate from the empirical ones.
The third panel shows idiosyncratic income and consumption volatility. The respective
empirical moments are taken from the literature (Heaton and Lucas (1996) and Brav,
Constantinides, and Geczy (2002)). While slightly larger, the model implied moments are
reasonably close.
The fourth panel displays the main result of the paper: Averages and volatilities of
market return and riskfree rate and the implied risk premium. In both cases the risk-free
rate and volatilities are very close to the empirical values. For the CRRA case the model
generates a risk premium of 3.5%, with the Epstein-Zin calibration the risk premium is
4.7%.
V.5.2 Epstein-Zin implications
We would like to understand in more detail the effects of Epstein-Zin preferences. For
this purpose, Table V.6 displays different combinations of risk aversion and intertemporal
6Every 3 months an unemployed agent has a chance p = 0.5 to regain employment. Thus, the expected
unemployment time is
∑
∞
i=1 p
i3i = 3 p(1−p)2 = 6 months.
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Table V.6: Asset prices with Epstein-Zin
γ ψ β E[Rm] E[Rf ] σ[Rm] σ[Rf ] E[Rm −Rf ]
5 0.20 0.97 5.1% 1.6% 18.8% 2.4% 3.5%
5 0.33 0.97 9.9% 6.6% 20.1% 1.2% 3.3%
8 0.20 0.97 −1.9% −6.5% 17.1% 3.2% 4.6%
8 0.33 0.97 7.2% 2.4% 19.1% 1.9% 4.8%
5 0.20 0.97 5.1% 1.6% 18.8% 2.4% 3.5%
5 0.33 1.04 4.3% 1.1% 19.2% 0.9% 3.1%
8 0.20 0.86 4.7% −0.2% 17.8% 4.3% 4.8%
8 0.33 0.99 6.1% 1.4% 19.1% 1.7% 4.7%
Data 8.7% 1.4% 17.1% 2.5% 7.3%
This table shows asset pricing moments for varying combinations of risk aversion (γ), intertempo-
ral elasticity of substitution (ψ) and the discount factor (β). The first panel keeps the discount rate
constant. The second panel varies the discount rate to obtain reasonable values for the risk-free rate. The
last panel repeats the empirical observation from Table V.5.
elasticity of substitution. We distinguish two cases. In the upper panel we keep the discount
rate constant at β = 0.97. In the lower panel, we adjust the discount rate to keep an almost
constant risk-free rate. Let us first look at the upper panel with a constant discount rate.
An increase in ψ implies a larger tolerance of different consumption levels across time
— agents will smooth their consumption less, therefore the risk-free rate volatility falls.
Furthermore, when we increase ψ, agents have less incentives to save as a precaution —
demand for bonds and stock falls and interest rates as well as the market return rise. As
ψ determines intertemporal choices, the impact on the risk premium is rather small. A
change in γ increases volatilities and risk premium, since agents are more afraid of risk.
An increased risk aversion also decreases the risk-free rate. Agents will have a greater fear
of unemployment. They rely on precautionary savings to prevent losses and therefore asset
prices rise, e.g. returns fall.
In the lower panel, we keep the risk-free rate almost constant to separate the effects
more clearly. ψ has strong effects on the risk-free rate volatility, yet only minor indirect
effects on the risk premium. An increase in risk aversion increases volatilities and the risk
premium.
V.5.3 Sensitivities in preference parameters
Table V.7 shows how the model responds to changes in one of the input parameters. The
first two lines repeat moments of the CRRA column of Table V.5 as a reference. In the
following lines, we vary one input parameter from Table V.4 at a time. The value in
parentheses repeats the respective value of the base case. We will now discuss the effects
one by one.
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Table V.7: Preferences — sensitivities
Case E[Rm] E[Rf ] σ[Rm] σ[Rf ] E[Rm −Rf ]
Base 5.1% 1.6% 18.8% 2.4% 3.5%
β = 0.96 (0.97) 6.0% 2.5% 19.0% 2.4% 3.5%
β = 0.98 (0.97) 4.2% 0.8% 18.7% 2.3% 3.4%
γ = 4 (5) 9.5% 6.6% 19.9% 1.6% 2.9%
γ = 6 (5) −0.7% −4.6% 17.6% 3.0% 3.8%
ψ = 0.15 (0.2) 1.2% −2.3% 18.2% 2.8% 3.5%
ψ = 0.25 (0.2) 7.8% 4.4% 19.4% 1.9% 3.4%
ς = 0 (10%) 11.3% 7.8% 20.2% 1.9% 3.5%
s¯ = 10% (15%) 5.5% 0.4% 28.7% 3.2% 5.0%
b¯ = 10% (20%) 1.6% −1.8% 17.2% 3.7% 3.4%
The first line repeats the model results for the CRRA case from Table V.5. The following lines
show deviations in one parameter. The first column describes the parameters, in parentheses we repeat
the respective value in the base case. The following columns display the different moments for each
calibration. β discount factor; γ risk aversion; ψ intertemporal elasticity of substitution; ς subsistence
level; s¯ stock supply; b¯ bond supply.
The discount rate (β) works as expected. A lower discount rate implies a higher interest
rate and vice versa. The effects on volatilities and the risk premium are negligible. The risk
aversion (γ) and IES (ψ) show similar qualitative results as in Table V.6. Risk aversion
decreases returns and increases risk premia. The IES affects primarily the returns and
has only minor effects on risk premia. The subsistence level (ς) has a strong impact on
asset returns. Agents are forced to a minimum level of consumption, thus unemployment
is particularly painful. As a precaution, agents invest more in assets, e.g. asset prices rise
and returns fall.
Reducing the stock supply (s¯) implies an increase in the stock volatility. In our model,
all aggregate risk is carried by stock holders. As there are less stocks, the relative risk
increases. Therefore, the stock volatility increases to 28.7% and consequently the risk
premium increases to 5.0%. The second effect is common for stock and bond supply (b¯).
Less supply, implies less possibilities to save, e.g. less supply of assets in general. As the
supply of assets decreases, the price increases, e.g. asset returns fall.
V.5.4 Impact of job loss
Table V.8 shows the impact of the introduction of job loss. In the upper panel, we show
possible model calibrations for the discount rate and risk aversion without idiosyncratic
risk. Since, we calibrated aggregate risk on income rather than consumption, introduced
a subsistence level and leveraged our firm, the model is capable of creating sizable risk
premia even without idiosyncratic risk. However, at the cost of extremely large risk-free
rates. With this result, we are in line with Mehra and Prescott (1985) and Weil (1989),
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Table V.8: Impact of job loss
1−∆ γ β E[Rm] E[Rf ] σ[Rm] σ[Rf ] E[Rm −Rf ]
100% 2 0.90 24.5% 22.9% 24.0% 1.1% 1.6%
100% 2 0.99 13.2% 11.8% 21.9% 1.0% 1.4%
100% 5 0.90 46.1% 41.6% 28.7% 1.8% 4.5%
100% 5 0.99 33.0% 28.8% 26.1% 1.6% 4.1%
45% 2 0.90 19.4% 17.8% 22.4% 0.3% 1.6%
45% 2 0.99 8.8% 7.4% 20.4% 0.3% 1.4%
45% 5 0.90 11.6% 7.9% 19.9% 2.8% 3.7%
45% 5 0.99 3.4% 0.0% 18.6% 2.3% 3.4%
Data 8.7% 1.4% 17.1% 2.5% 7.3%
This table compares different replacement rates (1 − ∆). In the upper panel, the replacement
rate is 100%, e.g. job loss has no effect. In the lower panel, the replacement rate is 45%, e.g. in case of
unemployment, income drops by 55%. The lines report moments of asset prices for different values of
risk aversion (γ) and (β) for preferences with constant relative risk aversion. The last line repeats the
empirical observations from Table V.5 as a reference.
who show that when β is constrained to lie below 1, it is impossible to generate large risk
premia, while keeping interest rates at a reasonable level. In this sense, we find the puzzle
to be more about the historically low interest rate, rather than the equity premium.
The introduction of idiosyncratic risk in the lower panel opens the path for large risk
premia and realistic risk-free rates. Since agents fear unemployment, they have strong
incentives to save as a precaution. Therefore, asset prices rise and returns decrease to
reasonable values. By calibrating γ = 5 and β = 0.99, we obtain a zero interest rate and
still maintain a sizable risk premium. Therefore, our model results suggest, that the large
risk premia are derived from aggregate risk, however, individual risks and the induced
precautionary savings justify the historically low interest rate and answer the question
raised by Weil (1989) “why is the risk-free rate so low?”
V.6 Conclusion
This paper relates risk premia to unemployment risk. Without idiosyncratic risk, we find
it possible to generate large risk premia, but only at the cost of an unreasonably large
interest rate. Similar to the literature7, we thus conclude the equity premium puzzle to
be more about the question why risk-free rates have been so low, rather than why equity
returns have been so high. Unemployment risk provides an answer. When unemployed
households face tight credit constraints and incomplete markets prevent them from insuring
their idiosyncratic risk, they have to rely on precautionary savings to dampen the effects
7See Kocherlakota (1996) for a survey.
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of unemployment. This creates strong demand for bonds and causes interest rates to fall
to realistic levels.
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V.A Normalization
The optimization problem is the same for each agent. Thus, for notational convenience,
we drop the agent specific superscript i in this section. Agents maximize utility (eq. (V.1)
on page 92) with respect to the budget constraint (eq. (V.2) on page 93) and wealth
accumulation (eq. (V.3) on page 93), i.e.
max
Ct,st,bt
Vt(Wt, zt) =
[
(Ct − ςYt)1−ρ + βEt
[
Vt+1(Wt+1, zt+1)
1−γ
] 1−ρ
1−γ
] 1
1−ρ
, (V.4)
s.t.
Wt + Yl,t = Qs,tst +Qb,tbt + Ct,
Wt+1 = Ps,t+1st + Pb,t+1bt.
To apply dynamic programming (Bellman (1957), Stokey and Lucas (1989)), we need our
model to be stationary. To achieve this, we normalize all equations with the trending
variable average income (Yt). We denote the normalized variables in our model with lower
case letters, i.e.
yt =
Yt
Yt
, vt =
Vt
Yt
, vt+1 =
Vt+1
Yt+1
, wt =
Wt
Yt
, qs,t =
Qs,t
Yt
, qb,t =
Qb,t
Yt
, ct =
Ct
Yt
.
The normalized payoffs to employees stock holders and bond holders are then
yl,t =
Yl,t
Yt
=
(1 + ψt)l¯Et−1[Yt]
Yt
= l¯(1 + ψt)
Et−1[gt]
gt
,
pb,t =
Pb,t
Yt
=
Et−1[Yt]
Yt
=
Et−1[gt]
gt
,
ps,t =
Ps,t
Yt
=
Yt − (1− s¯)Et−1[Yt]
s¯Yt
=
1− (1− s¯)Et−1[gt]
gt
s¯
.
We arrive at the normalized optimization problem by dividing (V.4) through Yt. The
normalized value function vt has the additional factor gt+1 adjusting tomorrow’s value to
account for economic growth (see (V.5)). In the normalized version of our model, we choose
to normalize prices and payoffs instead of asset holdings (see (V.6) and (V.7))
max
ct,st,bt
vt(wt, zt) =
[
(ct − ς)1−ρ + βEt
[
(gt+1vt+1(wt+1, zt+1)
1−γ
] 1−ρ
1−γ
] 1
1−ρ
, (V.5)
s.t.
wt + yt = qs,tst + qb,tbt + ct, (V.6)
wt+1 = ps,t+1st + pb,t+1bt. (V.7)
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V.B Equilibrium conditions
An analytic solution to (V.5) subject to (V.6) and (V.7) is unknown. To find a numeric
solution, we solve the first order conditions using a nonlinear equation solver. In this
section we derive the first order conditions starting from the Lagrangian.
V.B.1 Lagrangian
The Lagrangian for the normalized problem can be written as
L =
[
(ct − ς)1−ρ + βEt
[
g1−γt+1 v
1−γ
t+1
] 1−ρ
1−γ
] 1
1−ρ
+ λ [wt + yt − qs,tst − qb,tbt − ct] . (V.8)
Note that we state the budget equation explicitly while substituting the wealth accumula-
tion equation whenever necessary.
V.B.2 Derivatives
Differentiating (V.8) with respect to ct and st yields
∂L
∂ct
=
1
1− ρ
[
(ct − ς)1−ρ + βEt
[
g1−γt+1 v
1−γ
t+1
] 1−ρ
1−γ
] 1
1−ρ
−1
(1− ρ)(ct − ς)−ρ − λ = 0,
= vρt (ct − ς)−ρ − λ = 0, (V.9)
∂L
∂st
=
1
1− ρv
ρ
t β
1− ρ
1− γ
(
Et
[
g1−γt+1 v
1−γ
t+1
]) 1−ρ
1−γ
−1
Et
[
g1−γt+1 (1− γ)v−γt+1
∂vt+1
∂ct+1
∂ct+1
∂st
]
− λqs,t = 0.
From (V.9) we see that ∂vt+1
∂ct+1
= vρt+1(ct+1− ς)−ρ. The one-period lagged eq. (V.6) together
with the wealth accumulation eq. (V.7) imply ∂ct+1
∂st
= ps,t+1. Then the derivative with
respect to stock holdings can be written as
∂L
∂st
= vρt β
(
Et
[
g1−γt+1 v
1−γ
t+1
]) γ−ρ
1−γ
Et
[
g1−γt+1 v
−γ
t+1v
ρ
t+1(ct+1 − ς)−ρps,t+1
]− λqs,t = 0,
= vρt β
(
Et
[
g1−γt+1 v
1−γ
t+1
]) γ−ρ
1−γ
Et
[
g1−γt+1 v
ρ−γ
t+1 (ct+1 − ς)−ρps,t+1
]− λqs,t = 0.
Differentiating with respect to bond holdings bt yields
∂L
∂bt
= vρt β
(
Et
[
g1−γt+1 v
1−γ
t+1
]) γ−ρ
1−γ
Et
[
g1−γt+1 v
ρ−γ
t+1 (ct+1 − ς)−ρpb,t+1
]− λqb,t = 0.
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V.B.3 Normalized first order conditions
Finally, we simplify the first order conditions normalizing by vρt . For this purpose define
λ˜ = λ
v
ρ
t
. The first order conditions for consumption, stock holdings and bond holdings
become
(ct − ς)−ρ − λ˜ = 0,
β
(
Et
[
g1−γt+1 v
1−γ
t+1
]) γ−ρ
1−γ
Et
[
g1−γt+1 v
ρ−γ
t+1 (ct+1 − ς)−ρps,t+1
]− λ˜qs,t = 0,
β
(
Et
[
g1−γt+1 v
1−γ
t+1
]) γ−ρ
1−γ
Et
[
g1−γt+1 v
ρ−γ
t+1 (ct+1 − ς)−ρpb,t+1
]− λ˜qb,t = 0.
In the case of CRRA utility, ρ = γ. In this case, the first order conditions collapse to
(ct − ς)−γ − λ˜ = 0,
βEt
[
g1−γt+1 (ct+1 − ς)−γps,t+1
]− λ˜qs,t = 0,
βEt
[
g1−γt+1 (ct+1 − ς)−γpb,t+1
]− λ˜qb,t = 0.
The full set of equilibrium conditions combines the above first order conditions with the
market clearing conditions
n∑
i=1
sit = s¯, ∀t.
n∑
i=1
bit = b¯, ∀t.
V.C Computation
V.C.1 State space
The state of the economy is described by beginning of period normalized wealth wt of all
agents and the current shock zt.
V.C.2 Smolyak
Solving for all agents but one requires to find a full solution of the model, since all agents
have identical preferences. The remaining agent simply receives all residual quantities.
Thus, the state space dimension is equal to the number of agents minus one. The main
challenge in solving the model is the approximation of policy functions as they depend on
the entire wealth vector wt. We compute the case of six agents, thus the dimension of the
continuous state space is five. Consider, for example, a course grid of five points per axis. In
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this case, the number of grid points already amounts to 55 = 3125. The algorithm proposed
in Smolyak (1963) has the advantage that the number of points grows polynomially rather
than exponentially in the number of dimensions, providing a counterspell to the curse
of dimensionality. Applications of the Smolyak approximation algorithm in the field of
economics first appeared in Krueger and Kubler (2004). Recent applications are Krueger
and Kubler (2006) in an overlapping-generations model and Malin, Krueger, and Kubler
(2011) in a multi-country real business cycle model. To our knowledge, this is the first time,
Smolyak approximation is applied to an infinite horizon competitive equilibrium model.
V.C.3 Implementation of the borrowing constraint
An intuitive implementation of the borrowing constraint It ≥ I through Kuhn-Tucker
conditions leads to kinks in the policy function. The Smolyak algorithm, however, requires
the approximated function to be smooth. To avoid kinks, we compute an auxiliary problem.
Consider the normalized wealth space [w,w] for each agent8. First, we compute next
period’s policy over the state space ignoring the borrowing constraint. To account for the
constraint, we then overwrite the optimal policy with a constant outside of the bounds.
This ensures the borrowing constraints lie exactly at the boundary of the wealth space.
The above procedure may be equivalently formulated by the constraint, It ≥ I(st, w, w),
where I(.) is the investment policy and w refers to the wealth vector of all other agents.
Economically, this constraint is cumbersome and has no straight forward interpretation.
However, equivalence to the original problem can be achieved by choosing I = I(sut , w, w)
in the converged policy, where w = w+w
2
and sut the unemployed state. Assuming that the
borrowing constraint is non-binding in any state, in which the agent is employed and that
the agents investment policy does not depend on the others wealth vector, the auxiliary
and original problem yield the same solution.
To enforce the desired constraint (i) on normalized investment (it) reported in the paper,
we employ a (costly) optimization technique to arrive at according grid lower bound (w).
We solve the model on average about seven times until we arrive at the desired lower
bound.
V.C.4 Policy iteration
We apply standard dynamic programming techniques as described in Judd (1998) to solve
the model. As policies we choose to approximate the investment decision of each agent as
a function of the state variables, specifying the exogenous shock and the wealth of each
agent. Then we implement almost roll-over as the initial investment policy and initialise
the value function for each agent as well as price policies for both assets, accordingly. Given
these policies tomorrow, we solve for the optimal policies today at each Smolyak grid point
8This holds true for all agents except one. As described above, Smolyak requires a cubical state space.
Thus, one agent’s wealth space equalizes all others. In other words, the wealth space of one agent is the
residual of all others, [−(n − 1)w,−(n − 1)w]. Economically this can be interpreted as one agent being
capable to borrow almost infinite amounts.
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and finally use the Smolyak algorithm to approximate the policies. We iterate backwards
over time and repeat this procedure until investment policies, value functions and price
policies are converged.
Finally, we simulate one million quarters and compute the empirical moments on indi-
vidual consumption and asset returns reported in the paper.
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